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RUSSIA’S AFGHAN PROBLEM
The Russian Federation 
and the Afghanistan problem since 2001
Introduction
In recent years, there have been signs that Russia is reactivating its policy to -
wards Afghanistan in the political, economic and security spheres. Along with
the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and the difficult political
and security situation in Pakistan, there has been a rise in the importance of
the so-called ‘northern supply route’ for the forces participating in ISAF opera-
tions in Afghanistan (the NDN or Northern Distribution Network), part of which
runs through Russian territory1. So for this reason as well, the problem of
Afgha nistan has become a key issue in the dialogue between Russia and the US,
NATO and individual Western countries. Its role in Russia’s relations with the
countries of Central Asia, China, Pakistan, Iran and India is also growing.
This text is an attempt to analyse Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan and the
Afghan problem over the past ten years in its various dimensions, and also con-
tains elements of a forecast regarding how this policy will further evolve. This
work’s aim is to answer questions such as:
– What determines Russian policy on the Afghanistan question?
– How has Russia’s policy evolved, and what have its effects been?
– What are Russia’s interests?
At present, the situation in Afghanistan and the attitude of those taking part in
the military operations in the country have passed a new milestone. The Afghan
government is seeking a political agreement with its former chief opponent,
the Taliban. The USA and the states of the Western coalition are seeking to sta-
bilise the situation in Afghanistan, and to withdraw the bulk of their forces











1 For more see A. Kuchins, T. Sanderson, D. Gordon, ‘The Northern Distribution Network and the
Modern Silk Road. Planning for Afghanistan’s future’, CSIS, December 2009, Washington.
from that country within the next few years. So, the aims of this text include
the following: 
– to present the dilemma facing Russia in the light of these facts, and which
con cerns its choice of strategy concerning the Afghan problem; 
– to outline the main scenarios; and 
– to formulate an overall forecast of Russia’s future policy.
The text consists of five parts. The first outlines the considerations of Russia’s
Afghan policy, and its place within Russian foreign policy as a whole. The second
presents the Russian Federation’s policy towards Afghanistan, in both chrono-
logical order and by issues. The third part presents how Russian policy towards
the US and NATO forces’ operation in Afghanistan has evolved, in particular
what form Russian support for the operation has taken. In the fourth part,
Russia’s policy towards the Afghan problem is characterised in a regional con-
text. Finally, the fifth part contains conclusions and a forecast on Russian policy
towards the Afghan problem.












1. Russia’s policy towards the problem of Afghanistan has become one of the
key issues in Russian foreign policy, both regarding the countries of the re gion
and the key actors outside the region. This has been influenced by the evo-
lution of the internal situation in Afghanistan itself, among other factors. How -
ever, it has also been shaped under the influence of Russia’s changing rela-
tionship with the United States and leading Western countries, the countries
of Central Asia, China and the countries of South Asia.
2. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, Russia’s policy towards
Afghanistan went through various stages: from the offensive in 2001-2002,
when Russia attempted to build up a strong presence and influence in Afgha -
nistan; through a period of stagnation in 2003-2006, when Russia realised
that it could not compete effectively with predominantly Western influences
in the country; through to the period since 2007, which has marked a return
of Russia’s active policy towards Afghanistan, as Moscow began taking ad -
van tage of the deteriorating security situation to improve its relations with
the government in Kabul, and to increase its own importance to the Western
coalition forces.
3. Both Russia’s specific interests & aims, and its own policy towards Afgha -
nistan, have been subject to a certain evolution over the last ten years. How -
ever, at a basic level, several of those interests have remained unchanged.
Russia wanted to be as influential as possible in Afghanistan, while at the
same time limiting the influence of those countries whose policies it per-
ceived as threatening to its interests, particularly the US and Pakistan.
On the one hand, Russia did not want the Taliban to achieve full political and
military success, seeing that possibility as a certain challenge to their inte -
rests and influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia also supported
the international military presence based on the UN Security Council mandate
(albeit not always enthusiastically), thus demonstrating that only Moscow’s
participation in decisions could bring about positive effects.








On the other hand, it would not have suited Moscow to see the complete sta-
bilisation of Afghanistan if the Western military coalition had succeeded in
its aims. That would in fact have made Afghanistan an important foothold
for US influence, and opened up new opportunities for Central Asian states
to increase their independence from Russia, including by participating in
am bitious infrastructure projects.
4. By tracking the evolution of Russian policy, we can see in fact that two
strategies were being implemented (to simplify matters). During the first few
years, Russia was betting that the situation in Afghanistan would be stabi li -
s ed fairly rapidly, which would lead both to the withdrawal of Western for -
ces from Afghanistan, and more importantly, from Central Asia; this would
have opened up the possibility of Russia’s economic expansion and the over-
all growth of its influence in Afghanistan.
However, together with the deteriorating security situation and the expan-
sion of the Western presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia, Russia became
more interested in maintaining  the Western presence inside Afghanistan it -
self. On the one hand, that situation engaged the US and NATO’s forces, re sour -
ces and political attention in that country, thus weakening them by default;
on the other, it gave Russia an additional tool, by means of transit services and
transportation, to obtain political and economic benefits from them. At the
same time, however, Russia sought to limit the Western presence in Central
Asia, or at least make it subject to greater Russian supervision. Russia itself
increasingly sought to exploit the problem of Afghanistan, in order to in crease
its presence in Central Asia and strengthen its cooperation with the countries
in the region. Meanwhile, the plan to increase Russia’s presence in Afghani stan,
especially in the economic sphere, has been pushed into the background
(although it has not yet been discarded). The problem of Afghanistan is in -
creas ingly becoming an instrument of Russia’s policy towards the West and
the region surrounding Afghanistan. 
5. The period from 2009 to 2011 marks a new, breakthrough period in the
development of the Afghan problem. Hamid Karzai’s government is working
to achieve a political agreement with the Taliban. and the Western coalition
intends to withdraw the bulk of its forces from Afghanistan within a few








years. These moves have faced Russia with the dilemma of choosing a politi -
cal strategy. In this situation, Russia has been increasing its political support
for the Karzai government; it formally supports the ‘process of national re -
conciliation’ in Afghanistan, and has established contacts with the Taliban.
At the same time, though, it has taken an ambiguous stance on the withdraw-
al of Western troops from Afghanistan: on the one hand Moscow supports
the withdrawal, and is concerned over the possibility that any part of the US
forces might remain in the country long-term; but on the other hand, it is
concerned that Western forces might withdraw too hastily, and is uneasy
about the local security challenges which could arise after their departure.
Above all, however, Russia fears that at least some US forces may be relo-
cated from Afghanistan to other countries in Central Asia, which could in the
long run lead to the further erosion of Russian influence in the region.
6. In the longer term, Russia can simply either try to reproduce the anti-Taliban
alliance and the international coalition supporting it, creating a buffer zone in
northern Afghanistan; or it can support the Afghan government’s efforts to
achieve a political agreement, which may actually lead to the return of the
Taliban to power in Afghanistan – and Russia would then have to find a modus
vivendi with them.
7. It seems that there is disagreement among the Russian elite on which
strategy to choose; Russia seems to want to implement elements of different
approaches, and in this way try to keep some room for manoeuvre for as long
as possible. Therefore, Russian policy towards the Afghan problem is likely to
be reactive in nature, and will depend both on internal developments in
Afghanistan and the attitudes of important international actors.
Therefore, in the near future we can expect Russia to take the following actions:
simultaneously support Hamid Karzai’s government, develop contacts with
representatives of the former Northern Alliance, establish contacts with the
Pashtun elites, and hold dialogue with part of the Taliban;








maintain and even increase support in the security sphere for both the
Afghan government and the international forces (in particular, for their re -
turn transit), in expectation of political and financial benefits in return;
discourage the US and the Western allies from increasing their military
presence in Central Asia: one hand, by working with them; on the other, by
putting political pressure on the US and the Central Asian states; and also by
exploiting the active rise of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia, and promot-
ing a ‘controlled destabilisation’ of the region;
create instruments for increasing its security presence in Central Asia. 








I. Afghanistan’s place in Russian policy
1. Considerations in Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan
To better understand Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan, we must first ask our -
selves why Afghanistan is important for Russia. Geographical, historical and
socio-political contexts are all involved, as are Russia’s relations with specific
international actors.
1.1. Geographical considerations
From the perspective of Russia, Afghanistan occupies an important geo-political,
geo-strategic, and geo-economic location. It is a country which connects impor-
tant regions: post-Soviet Central Asia and the Middle East with South and East
Asia. In particular, the situation in Afghanistan has a directly effect on the post-
Soviet Central Asian countries, especially the southern area; in Russia’s eyes,
these states belong within its natural sphere of influence. Thus, Afghanistan
can play the role of either a buffer zone, protecting the vulnerable southern
bor der of Russia; or of a source of danger to this same borderland. The situa-
tion in and around Afghanistan significantly affects the potential course of
communication lines and the transit of energy, especially between Central and
South Asia. On this same basis, it can also be stated that from Russia’s stand-
point, Afghanistan is a country with a strategic location2. 
1.2. Historical considerations
The Russian state’s activity in Afghanistan dates from the beginning of the
nineteenth century, as part of the Russian Empire’s expansion in Central Asia
and its regional rivalry with the British Empire. As a result of Russian-British




























2 This idea was clearly expressed by the Russian president's special representative for Afghanistan,
Ambassador Zamir Kabulov, in an interview for the website Afghanistan.ru. He stated among other
things that the possible siting of (US) military bases in Afghanistan could lead to the projection of
power into resource-rich neighbouring regions. ‘Nuzhno idti v Afganistan s otkrytym serdcem’, inter-
view with Zamir Kabulov, www.afghanistan.ru, 25.05.2011.
agreements on delimiting their zones of influence3, Afghanistan fell on the
British side, separated from the Russian zone in Central Asia by the Panj river.
This informal separation proved to be quite stable, and was maintained in rela-
tions between Soviet Russia and Afghanistan. Communist Russia recognised
the independence of Afghanistan as early as 1919, and developed generally
friendly relations with it, although it did slowly make efforts to infiltrate the
Afghan elite. This approach bore fruit in 1978, when a military coup carried out
by pro-Communist and pro-Soviet officers made Afghanistan a formal ally of
the Soviet Union and part of the global socialist camp, although this led to
armed resistance from some of the Afghan people. In 1979, a Soviet military
intervention, linked to a coup d’etat, tightened the Soviet Union’s control over
Afghanistan, but also drew Moscow into a bloody war with the Islamic armed
opposition, contributing to the culmination of rising tensions in relations be -
tween the USSR and the West. The Soviet military intervention involved about
120,000 soldiers at its peak, but it did not stifle the armed resistance, which
was supported by the US and Pakistan, and led to the deaths of about 15,400
Soviet soldiers (according to official data). On the other hand, the period of So -
viet domination in Afghanistan left its mark on this country, in the form of sig-
nificant Russian economic involvement, as well as a significant Russian influence
among the Afghan ruling elite. Political chan ges in the Soviet Union and détente
in East-West relations led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, and the
reduction of military aid to the pro-Soviet Afghan government contributed to
its overthrow in 1992 by the armed Islamic opposition, ushering in a period of
prolonged civil war in Afghanistan. The conco mitant loss of Russian influence
in Afghanistan became one of the signs and sym bols of the collapse of Russia’s
global power status. Russia returned to acti vity in Afghanistan in the late 1990s,
and was fuelled by  on one hand with rising threats to the international com-
munity from the extreme Islamic fundamentalist Taliban government (which
ruled Afghanistan from 1996), and on the other with a policy of reconstructing
Russia’s ‘imperial’ position. It can likewise be stated that the Afghanistan ques-
tion was temporarily one of the central issues of Russian and Soviet foreign
policy, and a symbol of Russia’s status as a super power – or of the crisis in
that status.




























3 The first agreement on this issue was concluded in 1878, the next in 1895, and the next in 1907.
1.3. Socio-political considerations
Afghanistan’s importance for Russia depends on the close socio-cultural ties
between Afghanistan, especially its northern part, and post-Soviet Central
Asia. This is because northern Afghanistan is dominated by ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks
and Turkmen, who are adjacent to their compatriots in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan. This has had a major impact on the development of the inter-
nal situation both in Afghanistan (being one of the factors motivating the sup-
port given by Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the Northern Alliance (domi -
nated by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara) against the Taliban) and in the countries
of Central Asia, especially Tajikistan. In particular, the armed Islamic Tajik oppo-
sition used support bases in northern Afghanistan during the civil war in Tajiki -
stan in the years 1992-1997; whereas in 1997-2001, the Kulab region of Tajiki -
stan was the main base for the Afghan Northern Alliance.
The Afghanistan question, then, also became an internal problem for the Soviet
Union and Russia. The large number of victims of the Afghan conflict, which
directly involved around 620,000 young Soviet people, caused a deep trauma in
society and the Soviet elite. It created a kind of ‘Afghan syndrome’ – a reluc-
tance to engage the military on a large scale outside of Russia. Moreover, Afghan
war veterans, including disabled people, have become one of post-communist
Russia’s social problems. The state has not been able to cope with their re-
assimilation to social life, and sometimes they have joined the ranks of orga -
nised crime groups.
2. The problem of Afghanistan as a factor in Russia’s policy 
on the main actors
The problem of Afghanistan has been, and still is, an important element in
Russia’s relations with specific international actors, including the countries of
Central Asia, China, the USA, NATO and the wider Western countries, as well as
the countries of South Asia.




























2.1. The problem of Afghanistan and Central Asia & China
Russia has perceived, and still perceives, post-Soviet Central Asia as its natural
sphere of influence, and as a buffer zone to protect Russia’s ‘soft southern under -
belly’. Moscow has therefore undertaken both bilateral and multilateral initia-
tives to defend and consolidate its dominance in this area. Some elements of
this policy have been closely related to the situation in Afghanistan. In particu -
lar, the civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s and the subsequent ‘war on ter-
ror’ have given Russia valid arguments for maintaining and expanding its mil-
itary presence in Central Asia, including Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The threat
of terrorism and drug trafficking from Afghanistan has also permitted Russia
to push for closer multilateral cooperation in the sphere of security and defen ce,
with the participation of most Central Asian states (except Turkmenistan) in
the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organi sa -
tion (SCO), as well as in the specialised structures which these two organisa-
tions have created in this area.
On the other hand, it is precisely the situation in Afghanistan, especially the
international ‘anti-terrorist operation’ started there by the US and UK, then fol-
lowed by the rest of NATO, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,
which sparked the real geo-strategic ‘earthquake’ in Central Asia, marking the
beginning of the serious commitment and military presence of Western coun-
tries (especially the USA) in the region. Indeed, the Russian monopoly presence
in the field of security in Central Asia has been challenged, and the position of
the region’s countries has been strengthened. Moscow sensed a growing threat
to its own interests, which has led to active attempts to try and counteract this
situation.
At the end of the 1990s, the threat of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, as
well as the illegal trafficking of drugs with their source in Afghanistan, had
already given a strong push to improving Russian-Chinese cooperation (includ-
ing in the security sphere), in both the bilateral and multilateral forums which
they dominated, such as the ‘Shanghai Five’, which in 2000 was transformed
into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In the face of growing threats on
its own territory, including to (and within) Chinese Turkestan (the auto no mous
Xinjiang-Uighur region), Beijing has been understanding about Russia strength-




























ening its presence in the security sphere in Central Asia, seeing it as an impor-
tant bulwark against these growing threats. In turn, Moscow’s decision to con-
sent to the Western (mainly American) military presence in Central Asia after
11 September 2001 (a situation which it was partially forced into) caused seri-
ous concern in Beijing, which saw this as a direct challenge to its own securi-
ty interests. Since then China’s direct involvement in Central Asia has gradual-
ly increased (although this is least apparent in the security field), and Beijing is
also considering the increasing independence of the countries in the region.
This has caused, and continues to cause, growing concern in Russia.
2.2. The problem of Afghanistan and the West
The problem of Afghanistan has always been, and continues to be, part of Russia’s
complex relations with the Western world, where the competition between
them has been accompanied by partial cooperation. There have been both psy-
chological and political conditions to this problem. Some of the new Russian
political elite have inherited from the Soviet Union a syndrome of political fail-
ure in Afghanistan, in a war which was seen as a proxy war against the West ern
bloc led by the United States. This suspicious attitude towards the US was
strength ened by the predominant conviction in the Russian elite that the
Taliban’s success in Afghanistan in the 1990s was a direct result of military,
financial and political support from Pakistan, behind which stood the United
States. Despite this, in the light of subsequent military successes for the Taliban
from the beginning of 2000, dialogue and cooperation between Russia and
the US on Afghanistan were strengthened. As early as mid-2001, the Russian go -
vern ment attempted to positively revise its relations with the United States; the
situation in Afghanistan played a key role in this process. After the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001, Moscow (after a brief hesitation) gave limited
support to the US-led anti-terrorist military coalition and Operation Enduring
Freedom; this gave a public dimension to the policy which was then referred to
as ‘a pro-Western turn in Russian foreign policy.’ By making these gestures to -
wards the US and its Western allies (albeit sometimes under pressure from events),
Russia was counting on a breakthrough in the West’s policy, and also that the
West would recognise certain important Russian interests (including Russia’s
zone of influence within the CIS). However, the cooperation in Afghanistan and
on some other issues did not break down Moscow’s distrust of the USA. The




























relationship began to cool more visibly as of autumn 2002, upon the US’s prepa-
ration and subsequent implementation (spring 2003) of its armed intervention
in Iraq, despite Moscow’s strong opposition. Moscow’s concern was particu-
larly aroused by what it perceived as the growing involvement of the West
(the USA, NATO, the EU and its member states) in the region of the CIS. Faced
with Washington ignoring both its warnings and its offer of a political deal,
Russia moved onto an anti-Western offensive, which culminated in the war
with Georgia in August 2008. This aggressive Russian policy briefly cooled its
relations with the West. However, with the advent of the new Democratic ad -
mi nistration of Barack Obama in the US (from 2009) and the global economic cri-
sis, Russia began to react positively to Western initiatives for a positive break-
through in their mutual relations. Moscow responded with modest yet positive
gestures, the most important of which was the agreement on US military tran-
sit to Afghanistan through its territory (Germany, France and Spain had previ-
ously received such permission, as ‘rewards’ for their ‘pragmatic’ policy towards
Russia). Russia acted specifically to raise the importance of the so-called north-
ern transit route to Afghanistan for the coalition forces operating in the coun-
try. The curve of Russian-Western relations has also indirectly affected Russia’s
own policy towards Afghanistan. Even during the greatest crisis in their rela-
tions, Russia did not break off its limited cooperation with the West in Afgha ni -
stan. Either way, Russia’s policy towards the problem of Afghanistan has been,
and still remains, one of its most important instruments in its relations with
the West.
2.3. The problem of Afghanistan and South Asia
The situation in Afghanistan has also been, and is increasingly becoming, an
element of Russia’s dialogue with the important regional actors in South Asia,
particularly India, Pakistan and Iran. Together with Russia, India and Iran were
key sponsors (in the form of military and financial assistance) of the Northern
Alliance, the Tajik- and Uzbek-dominated Afghan opposition to the Taliban. Their
common interest was to prevent Pakistan from becoming excessively powerful,
as it was seen as the unofficial sponsor of the Taliban movement.
If some major energy projects are implemented, especially the long-discussed
TAPI gas pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India), it is also now in




























Russia’s interest that this should lead to a diversion of energy exports from
Central to South Asia at the expense of Europe (where they are competing with
Russian exports) and China (where Russia wants to increase its presence).
However, the last few years have seen an intensification of dialogue between
Russia and Pakistan, including on the Afghanistan issue. This can be interpreted
as an element of Russia’s policy to influence the internal situation in Afghani -
stan, especially the Karzai government and the Pashtun elite, as well as Russia
preparing itself for the possible return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.




























II. Russia and Afghanistan since 2001
Russia’s policy towards the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has three dimen-
sions: political relations; humanitarian and economic aid; and support in the
security sphere. Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan is being carried out by dif-
ferent actors, whose importance to and impact on this policy are constantly
changing. To understand Russian policy, it is also important to know the gene-
sis of the current situation, in particular Russia’s attitude towards Afghanistan
under the Taliban, and in the light of the Western military operation to over-
throw the latter.
1. Genesis of the situation: Russia, the Taliban regime 
and its overthrow
Russia’s policy towards the fundamentalist Taliban regime, which governed most
of Afghanistan from 1996, was formally very clear and principled. In reality,
however, there were certain inconsistencies.
In its public declarations, Russia condemned the Taliban regime and sought to
mobilise the international community against it. To this end, Moscow initiated
political dialogues with Iran, India and the USA (in the latter case, this was for-
malised in early 2000 with the establishment of a joint working group on Afgha -
nistan). Moscow was a co-sponsor of successive UN Security Council resolutions
in 1999 and 2000 condemning the Taliban and introducing further sanctions
against them. In March and May of 2000, Russia threatened the Taliban with
raids on its terrorist training bases (Moscow said it had information that
Chechen separatists were being trained at those locations). A measurable form
of Russian involvement was their providing not just political but also military
assistance (in the form of supplies of weapons, ammunition and heavy military
equipment) to the Northern Alliance (a coalition of groups and detachments of
Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara fighters, led by Ahmad Shah Masoud, the hero of the
previous struggle against the Soviet Army). In cooperation with Russia, Uzbe -
ki stan and Tajikistan also gave the Alliance similar assistance (as did Iran and
India). As the Russian side pointed out, it was this support which saved the


























Northern Alliance in the autumn of 2000, as they defended the last scraps of
Afghan territory they controlled before what then seemed to be their inevitable
defeat by the Taliban. It was also Russian military aid in autumn 2001 (togeth-
er with the air bombing of Taliban positions by the US and UK) which assisted
the Northern Alliance’s offensive leading to their liberation of Kabul in No vem -
ber that year, and the subsequent expulsion of the Taliban from almost the
whole of Afghan territory. Moreover, it was Russia which, arguing with the US
in October and November 2001, demanded that none of the (so-called moderate)
representatives of the Taliban should be admitted into the interim Afghan gov-
ernment (a move which Washington had been leaning towards).
On the other hand, Russia officially advocated a peaceful solution to the Afghan
problem (and therefore opposed any military action against the Taliban); yet
they were playing their own kind of game with the Taliban. The Russians made
their first publicly known contacts with the Taliban in 1995-1996, when Zamir
Kabulov negotiated the release of Russian airmen imprisoned by the Taliban in
Kandahar4. Later confidential contacts between the Russian Federation and Tali -
ban representatives were reportedly aimed at persuading the Taliban to re noun -
ce their support for terrorism5. In particular, these Russian/Taliban talks were
held between April and August 2000 in Turkmenistan (a state which maintain -
ed official contacts with the Taliban). Moreover, from the end of 1999 until pro -
bably September 2000, Russia suspended its military aid to the North ern Alliance,
which allowed the Taliban to achieve major successes in their offensive against
the Alliance in northern Afghanistan.
The most logical explanation for Moscow’s attitude was its wish to raise serious
concerns in the Central Asian countries bordering Afghanistan (especially Uzbe-
kistan), and prompt them to strengthen their cooperation with Russia in the
security sphere.


























4 See the communiqué on the Russian Federation president's decree on the nomination of Zamir
Kabulov, www.kremlin.ru 22 March 2011: http://kremlin.ru/news/10713
5 See the interview given by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Trubnikov to the newspaper
Komsomolskaya Pravda, 29 March 2001, www.mid.ru. For Russia, the problems included the fact that
the Taliban government had recognised the independence of Chechnya and established ‘diplo matic
relations’ with it.
It is also possible that there was limited, tactical cooperation between Russia
and the Taliban in giving some support to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU). The IMU is an armed Islamic organisation which appeared in 1999, with
the declared goal of overthrowing the Uzbek government of Islam Karimov and
establishing a caliphate in the Fergana Valley. The IMU’s foundation was laid by
certain former commanders of the United Tajik Opposition; after the civil war
in that country, some of them joined the Tajik government as part of the peace
process, while others remained in their bases in northern Afghanistan6. On two
occasions (in August 1999 and August-November 2000), the IMU conducted
armed attacks on the territories of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan from their bases
in Tajikistan (the so-called Batken crises). They were able to do so thanks to the
Tajik army’s passivity and despite the significant Russian forces stationed in
that country. Both crises ended with Russian helicopters transporting the IMU
militants from Tajikistan into Afghanistan, which could not have happened with -
out the Taliban’s agreement. A similar evacuation took place in August 2001,
although on that occasion it had not been preceded by any armed clashes7.
Another possible explanation for Russia’s attitude to the Taliban is that Mos cow
was convinced that they would defeat the Northern Alliance while the Western
states and other actors stood passively by. In this situation, Moscow decided to
prepare for a new status quo, especially since other countries, including several
in Central Asia, had made contacts with the Taliban for fear that they would be
diverted north of the Panj river (US representatives also made similar contacts
with the Taliban). However, this does not explain the successive turnarounds in
Moscow’s policy.
Russia’s final support for the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in autumn
2001 is easier to explain. Moscow had clearly undertaken an offensive to win
in fluence in Afghanistan, knowing the United States’ determination to destroy


























6 For more information on the IRU see e.g. Vitaly Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen
and Rifle, Lanham 2005, chapter 2.
7 For more, see e.g. Ahmad Rashid, Jihad. The Rise of Militant Islam In Central Asia, New Haven, 2002.
On the other hand, in mid-July 2001, a representative of the Taliban government accused Russia of
creating a secret training base for international terrorists in the Afghan province of Badakhshan,
which could disprove that allegation. This was officially denied in a communiqué from the Russian
Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 19 July 2001 (www.mid.ru).
the Taliban militarily after 11 September. In this context, both the significant
Russian military aid and the lobbying by Russian diplomacy in autumn 2001 for
the Afghan government to extend its recognition of Burhanuddin Rabbani (the
de facto representative of the Northern Alliance) were attempts to maximise
that influence. This attempt was initially quite successful, given that the interim
Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai, which was based on a compromise in
Bonn on 5 December 2001, was dominated by Northern Alliance leaders (along
with a group of Pashtun emigrés).
2. The evolution of Russia’s policy 
on the Afghan government and elites
When we analyse Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan, we can see a certain evo-
lution taking place. On this basis, it is possible to distinguish at least three stages
of this policy:
2.1. The Russian offensive towards Afghanistan’s interim government
(2001-2002)
The overthrow of the Taliban government, and then the formation of Afghani -
stan’s provisional government at the end of December 2001, marked the begin-
ning of Russia’s political offensive in that country. These intensive political con-
tacts were aimed at building the foundations of Russian influence on the politi -
cal, economic and security spheres in Afghanistan.
Immediately after the liberation of Kabul (26 November 2001) a group of Russian
diplomats came to the city to open a diplomatic mission, which was achieved
on 28 December.
In its relations with the new Afghan government, Russia initially focused on
Prime Minister Hamid Karzai and those influential members of government who
had been part of the former Northern Alliance. Among other things, Russia’s
then foreign minister Igor Ivanov visited Kabul on 4 February 2002, when he
invited Karzai to Moscow (who duly went there on 12 March and again on 4 June).
On 12 February, the Afghan deputy defence minister Marshal Mohammed Fahim


























(the Northern Alliance’s former chief of staff and intelligence) visited Moscow,
and principally discussed the supply of weapons and military equipment for
the emerging Afghan army; and on 28 February, the new interior minister Yunus
Kanuni (another Northern Alliance leader) also visited the Russian capital.
The Russian offensive in Afghanistan was clearly intended to achieve maximum
impact on the Afghan government, as well as to conclude various economic
and military agreements which would form a basis for Russia’s real influence
in Afghanistan.
2.2. The period of stagnation (2003-2006)
In 2003, Russian activity in Afghanistan clearly slowed down. Moscow finally
realised that its place in a country dependent on the support of the US and its
allies would mostly be defined by the good will of Washington. Russia thus
tried to make the most of the assets it had, especially the fact that the Afghan
army and security forces were still using equipment inherited from the Soviet
period. So, with the consent of the United States (or with its indirect assis-
tance), the Afghan forces continued to receive spare parts and equipment from
Russia for their military use. However, on one hand, conflicts within the Afghan
government led to the departure in autumn 2004 of some of the former North -
ern Alliance leaders, at the expense of strengthening Hamid Karzai’s position
(he won the October presidential election that year); and on the other, there was
a distinct cooling of relations between Russia and the West at the same time
(mainly against the background of events in Ukraine), which in turn translated
into a visible cooling of relations between Moscow and Kabul. The chill in rela-
tions between Russia and the West resulted in a more critical attitude towards
the Western military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and a pause in
military assistance to Afghanistan in 2005.
2.3. Russia’s return to Afghanistan (2007-?)
However after 2006, the steadily deteriorating security situation in Afgha ni -
stan (due to the ever-increasing intensity of the Taliban’s military action in
Afghanistan and on the Pakistani/Afghan border) and the growing tensions be -
tween President Karzai and the Western participants in the coalition forces


























(especially the US) prompted Karzai to seek political support abroad, beyond his
traditional allies; and this included Russia.
Russia responded to this by diversifying its political activity in Afghanistan.
Firstly, it maintained its contacts with its traditional (especially Tajik) allies
from the former Northern Alliance, and most likely supported the creation in
2007 of a new Afghan opposition bloc, the National Front (a move mainly driv-
en by Iran), which was dominated by Russia’s traditional partners in northern
Afghanistan. However, this project soon fell apart because of internal conflicts,
and some of the participants came to an understanding with the Karzai govern -
ment.
Secondly, Russia openly increased its public support for President Hamid Karzai
by calling for an increase in real independence (de facto from the West) for the
Afghan government, and loudly criticised the ISAF’s poor results in the fight
against the Taliban and the illegal production and trafficking of drugs. In addi-
tion, Moscow initiated a dialogue with Pashtun politicians and declared its sup-
port for Karzai’s policy of national reconciliation, including possible talks and
peace terms with the ‘moderate’ or ‘rank and file Taliban’. Russia formulated four
conditions for this: the renunciation by the ‘moderate Taliban’ of the armed
struggle; breaking their ties with al-Qaeda; the recognition of the constitution
and other laws of Afghanistan; and not holding any talks with the extremist
Taliban leaders, as defined by UN sanctions8.
Russia’s support for President Karzai rose in direct proportion to the rising ten-
sion between him and the United States, the other key Western states, and the
coalition forces in Afghanistan. This became especially clear during and after
the presidential elections in Afghanistan in August 2009. Unlike the West, which
put political pressure on Karzai to share power with the opposition, Russia gave
him its de facto unconditional support, despite numerous allegations that the
Afghan authorities rigged the ballot. Russia also began to openly communicate
with representatives of the ‘moderate Taliban’ (one of whom visited Moscow in


























8 See e.g. the Russian ambassador to the UN Vitaly Churkin’s speech to the UNSC of 23 March 2010,
www.mid.ru.  
spring 2009)9. Much indicates that direct contacts between representatives of
‘official’ Moscow and the Taliban took place in 201110. 
3. The main political actors
3.1. The centres of Russia’s Afghan policy 
It is a little difficult to analyse Russia’s interests and policy towards Afghani -
stan, because they have been influenced and affected by several centres and cir-
cles, and both the debate and the decision-making process are still to a great
extent unclear. The situation was complicated when the system of direct presi -
dential power was succeeded in 2008 by the system of government under the
‘ruling tandem’ of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Med -
vedev. While formal leadership in foreign policy remains with the president, it
seems that in practice this policy is still under the decisive influence of Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin (among other techniques, he makes use of the govern-
ment apparatus and the presidium of the government, as well as his personal
ties inside the Presidential Administration, and his own influence on the pres-
ident). However, President Medvedev’s role in shaping foreign policy tactics
seemed to be increasing, with his use of the apparatus of the Presidential Admi -
nistration and of outside experts.
Irrespective of this, we can name some other centres of influence on Russia’s
policy towards Afghanistan, based on policy observations and the opinion of
Russian experts:


























9 Mohamad Washim Watanwal of Nangarhar province was a participant in the Russo-Afghan confer-
ence in Moscow in May 2009. There were also reports in early 2009 that Russia had taken control of
one or more groups of Taliban operating in North and South Waziristan on the Pakistani border.
A. Serenko, ‘Na ‘linii Dyuranda’ poyavilis' 'Russkie Taliby'’, www.afghanistan.ru, 29 May 2009:
http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/14815.html
10 Cf. M.K. Bhadrakumar, ‘Mullah Omar gets a Russian visitor’, Asia Times online, 24 March 2011:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MC24Df01.html. The Russian President’s special repre-
sentative Zamir Kabulov admittedly denied the information about contacts with the Taliban, but at
the same declared that Russia would be ready for this. Xinhua, 29 March 2011.
– The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, under Sergei Lavrov,
has so far formally played a co-ordinating role; this was reflected by the Presi -
dent’s appointment in 2002 of an Interdepartmental Committee on Afghani -
stan, chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It included representatives from
at least ten relevant ministries, agencies and departments. In practice, however,
the MFA was and remains primarily an executor of policy, and one of the centres
of influence. The MFA has a particularly important role in intensifying dialogue
on Afghanistan within the region, covering India and Pakistan, China and Iran.
– The Federal Drug Control Service, and specifically its head Viktor Ivanov (who
represents some of the secret services’ officers) is formally only responsible for
one section of Russia’s relations with Afghanistan and the countries involved
in resolving the Afghan problem: cooperation in combating drug trafficking from
Afghanistan. However in practice, the FDCS’s activity and its contribution to
Afghanistan in recent years has grown steadily, and the FDCS has become the
de facto parallel channel (and an alternative to the MFA) for Russia’s interna-
tional dialogue, including with the USA (Ivanov co-chairs the Russian-American
subcommittee on anti-narcotics cooperation within the Lavrov/Clinton Presi -
den tial Commission) and with Afghanistan’s neighbours. He played an active
and very visible role in 2009 and especially 2010, with the beginning of the
joint Russian-American drug operation.
– The Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) under Yevgeni Primakov (who
resigned as chairman in March 2011, and was replaced by Sergei Katyrin) and
deputy head Boris Pastukhov, who also represent the wider business lobby (led
by Abubakar Arsamakov, the head of the Russian-Afghan Business Council, and
head of the Moscow Industrial Bank MIB); they mainly lobby for the creation of
conditions to increase Russia’s economic presence in Afghanistan. So far, the
CCI’s activity has had little effect. Nor has the departure from the chairmanship
of the influential Yevgeni Primakov (a former prime minister and former head
of civilian intelligence) helped to raise the CCI’s profile.
– The President of the Russian Federation’s special representative on Afgha -
nistan, the former Russian ambassador in Kabul and former head of the 2nd Asian
Department of the MFA Zamir Kabulov. Since the establishment of this post (by
decree of President Medvedev on 22 March 2011), he has been the most dynamic


























centre of Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan and the Afghan problem. It seems
that Kabulov has had some success in trying to take over the role of not only
the formal policy coordinator for the Russian Federation on Afghan matters
(the presidential decree is one of the instruments of office which can improve
coordination between departments11, but also the real coordinator of the policy
line as well.
Other centres also influence Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan. The most im -
portant ones seem to include the secret services, particularly the Main Intelli -
gence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU, military intelligence). This is be -
cause there are a substantial number of Russian specialists on Afghanistan speak-
ing the local languages, who are former Soviet Army officers who participated
in the 1980s intervention in Afghanistan. The secret services are the Russian
government’s main source of information and analysis on Afghanistan and the
situation in its immediate surroundings, as well as an important channel of
dialogue for actors both inside and outside Afghanistan.
A role in policy towards Afghanistan has also traditionally been played by the
Ministry for Emergency Situations (MChS), but this is mainly limited to sup-
plying humanitarian aid.
The renewal of Russian-Afghan military cooperation may contribute to a renewed
rise in the Ministry of Defence’s role in the conduct, and in particular, the im -
plementation of Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan.
3.2. The foundations of Russia’s political influence in Afghanistan
Russia’s relations with the new Afghan government which was created after
the overthrow of the Taliban, and more broadly with Afghanistan’s political elite,
have not proceeded in a vacuum. In fact, Russia has a base of influence among
the Afghan political elites which has been clearly shaped over several decades.


























11 See the decree by the President of the Russian Federation, www.kremlin.ru, 22 March 2011, op.cit.
More on the characters and the role of Zamir Kabulov in M.K. Bhadrakumar, ‘Mullah Omar gets
a Russian visitor’, Asia Times online, 24 March 2011: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/
MC24Df01.html
Russia’s influence among the political and social elite of Afghanistan has been
shaped over four historical periods: 
– firstly, during the reign of King Zahir Shah (especially in the 60s), mainly in
relation to the training of Afghans in Soviet civilian and military academies;
– secondly, after the communist coup in 1978, on the basis of cadres of the rul-
ing Communist party (the Liberal Democratic Party of Afghanistan), who were
educated in the USSR and closely associated it, as well as the defence and law
enforcement institutions and the Khadamat-e Etela’at-e Dawlati or KHAD (the
state security agency);
– thirdly, during the civil war, and especially the fight against the Taliban in the
1990s (particularly the Tajik and Uzbek members of the Northern Alliance com-
manders, who were generally supported by Russia);
– fourthly, this was supplemented by new individuals and groups who came
into contact with Russia after the overthrow of the Taliban.
As a consequence, the people who were once and/or now are linked to Russia,
and/or who support closer cooperation with Moscow, may include representa-
tives of different backgrounds:
– former activists of the Afghan communist party (LDPA), some of whom are
still active politically (such as Said Mohammad Nurul Gulabzoy, Ulumi Khan, or
Habib Mangal);
– some of the former Northern Alliance leaders, including Marshal Muhammad
Qasim Fahim, a former chief of staff and intelligence for the Alliance, a former de -
fence minister of Afghanistan, and currently first vice president; Yunus Qanuni,
a former interior minister and former president of the lower house of parlia-
ment; Abdullah Abdullah, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and recent pres-
idential candidate, and leader of the opposition Reform and Hope Party; General
Abdul Rashid Dostum, one of the leaders of the Uzbek community; and former
Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani (murdered in September 2011);


























– certain other former or present public officials in the Karzai government, in -
cluding Vice President Ahmad Zia Masud; a former trade minister and head of
the parliamentary committee on economy, Said Mustafa Kazimi;
– some Afghan businessmen and representatives of the Afghan diaspora in Russia
(which is not very integrated, and does not itself constitute an influential lobby)12. 
An important element of building up Russian influence in Afghanistan was and
is the education and training of Afghan civilian and military personnel in Russia.
According to Russian estimates, a total of over 15,000 Afghan citizens have been
educated in Russia, of which about 1400 Afghans have graduated from Soviet
civilian and military universities. Many of them became part of the political,
business and security elites of independent Afghanistan. Moreover, after the
over throw of the Taliban, Russia has granted dozens of scholarships annually
to students and Afghan government officials for education in Russian universi-
ties. For example, in 2004 there were 50 scholarships per year; 75 in 2007, and
from 2008, 80 scholarships. For 2010, 100 scholarships were prepared, and 115
for 201113. In 2011, about 400 Afghans were being educated at Russian universi -
ties at the same time14. The training of military personnel and officers from other
services is a separate issue (see below).
The further expansion of Russian influence in the Afghan elite will undoubted-
ly be served by the planned reactivation of the Soviet-built University of Kabul.
Russia has allotted about US$2 million for this purpose, with a further $4 mil-
lion to be spent by Russia as part of international aid for the development of
education in Afghanistan. The announced opening of the House of Russian
Science and Culture in Kabul will have a similar effect.


























12 The Afghan diaspora in Russia is estimated at between 50,000 and 150,000 people (the lower number
is more likely). For more, see Khomayun Kadiri, ‘Afganskaya diaspora v Rossii’, www.afghanistan.ru,
24 April 2011. 
13 Press conference of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov after meeting the Foreign Minister of
Afghanistan Zalmay Rasul, Moscow 25 November 2011, www.mid.ru.
14 Information given by Sergey Prichod'ko, assistant to the president of the Russian Federation,
Afghanistan.ru, 14 June 2011, http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/20292.html
However, the challenge for Russia remains how to make use of these instruments
effectively. While it may be assumed that, thanks to its numerous and long-
standing contacts, Moscow may learn much about the internal situation in
Afghanistan, its ability to actively influence this situation is more questionable.
This is because the politicians mentioned above (with the possible exception of
Marshal Fahim, who is actually suspected of collaboration with the Russian
secret services) are currently not very ‘controllable’ by Russia, and experts also
believe that they have support from some other international actors (this per-
tains to Abdullah, Kanuni and Rabbani). The experience of Russian policy to -
wards the Afghan government and its elites also demonstrates this. 
4. Russia’s humanitarian aid and economic presence in Afghanistan
4.1. Russian humanitarian aid for Afghanistan
Russia’s image in Afghanistan was improved by the despatch there of signifi-
cant Russian humanitarian aid. As early as 26 November 2001, a transport arriv-
ed in liberated Kabul with emergency rescuers from the Russian Ministry for
Emergency Situations (MChS); they brought humanitarian supplies and a field
hospital, which gave free medical care to the city’s residents. Another field hos-
pital was set up at the Bagram base near Kabul. Workers from MChS also built
a crossing over the Panj river border, and opened up a passageway through a stra -
tegic tunnel under the Salang pass. According to Russian data, in 2002-2009 Russia
sent humanitarian aid to Afghanistan worth US$40 million15. In addition, in
February 2009, Russia gave Afghanistan 18,000 tons of wheat flour worth US$11
million. Also, in August 2009, a joint Russian/German project sent Afghanistan
two MI-8 and MI-17 medical-rescue helicopters valued at US$14 million (Russia
financed half of the package). In 2009, 50 cars and two fire trucks were provid-
ed free of charge. A year later, subsequent shipments of wheat flour to the tune
of US$5 million were made. Plans have been laid to continue providing human-
itarian aid; specifically, Russia plans to build a specialist children’s hospital in
Kabul.


























15 Interview with the Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksei Borodavkin for ITAR-TASS on 21 August 2009,
www.mid.ru.
In turn, according to Afghan data, official development assistance (ODA) from
the Russian Federation in 2002-2009 amounted to US$147 million (aid account-
ed for only 0.4% of the total international development assistance transferred
to Afghanistan in this period; and Russia was only 18th among the countries and
international structures that provided assistance, going beyond the purely hu -
manitarian sphere and into the field of security)16.
4.2. Russian investments in Afghanistan
Since the interim Afghan government was set up, Russia has expressed interest
in actively participating in the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. Russia
declared that its priority was to rebuild the destroyed economic sites which
had been built during the Communist regime in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union
built 142 such sites in Afghanistan, and the construction of 150 more was not
completed. Russia has been particularly interested in investing in the energy,
transport and construction sectors in the northern and central parts of Afgha -
ni stan.
So far, however, the number of significant economic projects and transactions
carried out by or with the participation of Russian companies remains small, al -
though the figure is slowly rising. The most important of them are as follows17: 
– the modernisation of the Naglu hydroelectric power plant in Kabul province
(a project initiated in 2007 by the contractor Technopromeksport, valued at
US$32.5 million, and scheduled for completion in early 2012); 
– the construction of mini-hydro plants by the Inset company, in the provinces
of Fayzabad (12 MW); Parwan (0.4 MW, US$500,000); Paktia (0.4 MW, US$400,000),
Bamyan (50 kW, US$100,000); 


























16 Official data from Donor Financial Review. Report 1388, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Ministry
of Finance, November 2009: http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/Donor%27s
FinancialReview% 20ReportNov2009.pdf
17 Rossiysko-afganskoye torgowo-ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo (spravochnaya informatsya),
www.mid.ru, 27 February 2009.
– the sale before 2004 of 1000 UAZ cars to the the UN, and 500 Volga cars to
the government of Afghanistan; 
– sales in 2007 of Kamaz trucks and other equipment to the Ministry of Con -
struc tion and the mayoralty of Kabul, for the sum of US $10 million; 
– sales in 2007 by a refinery in Omsk of 35,000 tons of gasoline. 
In addition, the Russo-Afghan transport joint venture AFSOTR was reactivated
in May 2008. Also, Russian specialists are building a 3G mobile communications
network in northern Afghanistan. According to Russian data, Russian companies
have invested over US$34 million in total in Afghanistan over the period from
2006 to 2008; in 2007-2009, this amount was estimated at about US$40 million18.
More investment is under discussion. In particular, the Zarubiezhtransstroy com-
pany is applying to modernise the strategically important Salang tunnel (the
problem here is agreeing on the scope of the work and how to finance it19); and
the Tupolev company, along with the Moscow Industrial Bank (MIB) wants to
complete the construction of two TU-204 aircraft for air transport links with
Russia (the value of this last project is US$100 million). These projects will com-
plement by the plans to reconstruct the Jalalabad channel with drainage facili -
ties; construct a bridge over the Amu Darya river, and a transshipment base in
the region of the Khayraton border crossing; and rebuild the power plants in
Mazar-i-Sharif and Kilagay, as well as selected mills, elevators, and bakeries.


























18 ‘O deyatelnosti TPP Rossii w 2010 g. na afganskom napravlenii’: www.tpp-inform.ru/userdata/
1288001637.doc  For comparison, according to UNCTAD data, foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Afghanistan in 2007-2009 totalled US$728 million (which would mean that Russia would have
accounted for 5.5% of that sum). Data from World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a low-carbon
economy, New York, Geneva 2010, Annex table 1: http://www.paiz.gov.pl/files/?id_plik=13221
19 A memorandum on this issue was already signed in 2001. It was originally planned for Russia to
be the main contractor, with the British and French as sponsors. But so far, no final agreement has
been reached. Russia is interested in a comprehensive modernisation of the tunnel and the associated
infrastructure, and money for the project is expected to come from international funds. This subject
was revisited during President Karzai’s visit to Moscow in January 2011. However, no binding deci-
sion has yet been taken.
Russia is also still interested in other important projects, particularly extract-
ing oil and natural gas from Sheberghan deposits; extracting gold from the Shamti
deposit on the border with Tajikistan; rebuilding the nitrogen plant in Mazar-i-
-Sharif, the cement plant in Pul-i-Kumri and the power system in Kabul; as well
as in construction work and supplying technicians in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and
in Khost province20.
Russia seems to be giving its offer in the energy sphere high priority, including
in particular the construction of high-voltage electrical cables for transmitting
power from Tajikistan to Afghanistan (the CASA-1000 project; according to Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin, the Russian electricity company Inter RAO-YES is will-
ing to invest US$500 million if it becomes the operator of the project), the con-
struction of similar links from Turkmenistan and within Afghanistan itself, and
Gazprom’s possible participation in the construction of the trans-Afghan TAPI
pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India; see below), and the partic-
ipation of Russian companies in building refinery plants in Sari Pul, Faryab and
Balkh21.
However, Russia’s economic involvement has hit some obstacles, and Russia has
suffered defeats. The most significant economic defeat for Russia is the Tiazh -
prom eksport and Soyuzmetalriesurs companies’ loss (to the China Metallur gical
Group) of the lucrative tender to operate the Aynak copper deposits (worth
US$88 billion) over a 30-year period. Furthermore, in 2008 the Russian telecom-
munications company Megafon withdrew from the tender to privatise Afghan
Telecom, citing the inflated price and security issues as reasons for doing so. In
turn, in 2010 the Moscow Industrial Bank (MIB) withdrew from the tender for
the controlling stake in the Kabul Combine Construction and cement plant in
Jab-ul-Siradj, and from plans to build a 10 MW hydroelectric power plant in the


























20 Information from ‘O deyatelnosti TPP w 2010 g...’, op. cit.; Joint statement by the President of the
Russian Federation Dmitri A. Medvedev and the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghani stan
H. Karzai, Moscow, 20 January 2011, www.kremlin.ru.
21 Joint declaration..., op.cit.; I. Tulyakov, ‘Vierniotsa li Rossiya w Afganistan?’ Pravda, 24 January 2011;
‘W ozhydanii rossiysko-afganskoy perezagruzki’, www.afghanistan.ru, 18 January 2011; ‘Rossiya i Afga -
nistan rasshyriayut sotrudnichestvo v energeticheskoy sfere’, www.afghanistan.ru, 3 May 2011. 
region of the Salang tunnel (the project’s total value was US$100 million). They
said that they could not meet the conditions which the Afghan side imposed.
The MIB has also suspended the opening of its branch in Afghanistan for the
time being22.
Usually Russian representatives officially give two main causes for the prob-
lems connected with investing in Afghanistan: (until 2007) Afghanistan’s debt
to Russia, which supposedly for formal reasons prevents state support for loans
and investments, as well as the unstable security situation in Afghanistan. and
the associated fears of Russian companies of entering the Afghan market. The
other cited explanations sound more credible, in particular the Afghan govern-
ment’s reluctance to open the market up to Russian capital, as well as fierce com -
petition (especially from China, Pakistan and Iran) on the Afghan market. The
Afghan government has preferred to construct new business sites, using modern
technology, rather than rebuild the outdated post-Soviet facilities with the help
of Russian specialists. Russian businessmen, in turn, have complained about
the lack of support for them from the Russian government, including access to
loans. Another problem was the delay in signing the Russian-Afghan intergov-
ernmental agreement on trade and economic cooperation (which was first an -
nounced in 2007); this delay revealed the problems involved in bringing the
parties together regarding the specific conditions for cooperation. Eventually
the agreement and the related action plan were signed on 20 January 2011 dur-
ing President Karzai’s visit to Russia. One element of this was the announce-
ment that a Russian-Afghan commission on trade and economic cooperation
was being set up; the agreement on this was signed on 14 June this year, and
its chairmen are the Russian energy minister Sergei Shmatko and Afgha nistan’s
finance minister Omar Zakhiwal.
Some hope for a breakthrough in investment appeared with the international
conference on support for Afghanistan in London in January 2010. Russia pre-
sented the conference (and previously the NATO–Russia Council) with its pro-


























22 Information from ‘O deyatelnosti TPP v 2010 g...’, op. cit. The projects mentioned were once again
mentioned on the list of proposed Russian investments in the Joint Statement signed during
President Karzai’s visit to Moscow in January 2011. See the ‘Joint statement....’, op. cit.
posal for Russian companies to comprehensively reconstruct and modernise the
former Soviet economic facilities in Afghanistan. However, Russia also an -
nounc ed that it expected this plan to be financed from international aid funds
for Afghani stan (specifically from countries which had not participated in the
hostilities), and that Russian companies would receive contracts without hav-
ing to compete in tenders. The Russian proposals were received without enthu -
siasm23.  Hope was re-awakened by President Karzai’s visit to Moscow on 20-21
January 2011, during which the Afghan leader enthusiastically invited Russian
capital to in vest in Afghanistan, including in the energy sphere; at the same
time he mentioned Afghanistan’s readiness to significantly increase its imports
of Rus sian oil products.
4.3. Trade and the problem of debt
Russian-Afghan trade has been unimpressive, but did start to rise significantly
as of 2008 (according to some data, annual turnover in 2000-2003 ranged be -
tween US$16-37 million, then rose in 2004 to about US$81 million; and then
declined until 2006, to US$15 million, to rise again in 2007 to US$68 million; in
2008 it jumped to about US$190 million)24. In 2009, according to some sources,
the numbers fell sharply25; according to others (the Russian Federal Customs
Service), trade continues to rise (up to US$352 million in 2009, and US$456 million
in the first 10 months of 201026). During his Moscow visit in January 2011, Pre si -
dent Karzai said that annual turnover amounted to about US$500 million. In trade,


























23 See ‘Rossiya sobirayetsia vosstanavlivat’ Afganistan na zapadnye dengi’, Kommersant, 27 January
2010: kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1311061;  Interview with Ambassador of the Russian Fede -
ra tion to NATO Dmitri Rogozin, for the daily Komsomolskaya Pravda, 27 January 2010: www.kp.ru/
daily/24431/599738/
24 Russian and Afghan figures, cited by the Russian Federation’s former head of commercial represen-
tation in Kabul, Valery Ivanov, after ‘Tovarooborot mezhdu Afganistanom i Rossiyei udvoilsa’,
www.afghanistan.ru. More statistics (until 2007) come from the Russian Federation’s State Committee
of Statistics; yet more from the Russian Foreign Ministry for 2007-8 (US$381 million) based on the
Afghan data. C.f. www.gks.ru; ‘Rossiysko-afganskoye torgovo-ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo (spra -
vochnaya informatsya)’, www.mid.ru, 27 February 2009.
25 According to V. Ivanov, over 9 months of 2009 these amounted to only 29 million dollars; figures
from www.afghanistan.ru, 12 November 2009.
26 FTS data from T. Abdullayev, ‘Afghanistan – svobodny rynok’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 24 January 2011:
http://www.rg.ru/2011/01/24/afganistan.html
Russia had a significant balance surplus, exporting about US$176 million to Afgha -
nistan in 2008 (mainly fuel and lubricants, wood and timber products, metal
pro ducts, food, transportation, machinery & equipment, and pharmaceuticals),
and only importing about US$14 million (mainly fruits, raisins and carpets). In
the first 10 months of 2010, exports reached around US$439 million, while im -
ports came to about US$17 million. The growth in turnover contri buted to im -
proving Russian-Afghan relations, as did the resolution of the problem of Afghan
debt to Russia. Meanwhile, according to the IMF, Russia was Afgha ni stan’s fifth
largest partner in imports 2010 (€222.6 million, 4% of total imports), and the sixth
biggest in  exports (€10.1 million, 2.9% of total exports)27.
Since the beginning of 2004 talks with Afghanistan on settling post-Soviet debt
(totalling approximately US$12 billion, largely due to the supply of Soviet arms
to the pro-Communist government in Kabul) have been intensified. The new
Afghan government long refused to recognise this debt, for obvious reasons;
but Russia was insistent, offering to write the debt off almost completely, on
condition that it was converted into participation by Russian companies in eco-
nomic projects and joint venture assets in Afghanistan. Moscow saw this as an
opportunity to significantly increase its economic presence in Afghanistan.
In the end, an intergovernmental agreement on this was signed on 6 August
2007. This cancelled the vast majority of the US$11.1 billion debt which Afgha -
nistan had incurred to Russia for the old Soviet arms supplies, and to a minor
degree, from the settlement of trade clearing schemes. Russia broke up the re -
maining US$730 million (after reduction) of the debt into instalments, to be repaid
over a 23-year period28. In 2010 the debt, which had then reached US$891 mil-
lion, was completely written off by Russia29.


























27 IMF data from Afghanistan's trade with main partners (2010), the European Commission, DG Trade,
8 June 2011: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_114134.pdf
According to this data, Afghanistan’s main partners in imports are: the United States (31.8%),
Pakistan (20.6%), the EU (13.2%) and India (7%); in exports: India (24.6%), Pakistan (23.8%), the USA
(16.8%), the EU (12.6%), and Tajikistan (8.9%).
28 ‘Rossiysko-afganskoye...’, op.cit., www.mid.ru, 27 February 2009.
29 Speech by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at an international conference in Kabul on July 20,
2010: http://www.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf/1083b7937ae580ae432569e7004199c2/432569d80021985fc
3257766004b3739?OpenDocument 
Russian-Afghan relations have been somewhat hindered by the actions taken in
Russia itself against Afghan small market traders (among others), in particular
the closure on 31 July 2009 of the Sevastopol shopping centre in Moscow (where
approximately 500 small businesses from Afghanistan were operating), on char-
ges of selling illegal goods. The traders’ complaints have been taken up by Afgha-
ni stan’s parliament.
On the other hand, initiatives have been undertaken to boost economic ex chan -
ges. These include the Afghan Business centre (representing the Afghan Cham -
ber of Commerce), which was opened in Moscow in September 2010 with the
support of the Russian Chamber of Commerce; its aim is to foster the econom-
ic exchange and business activity on both markets.
4.4. International infrastructure projects
Another element of Russia’s economic policy towards Afghanistan was its atti-
tude towards large international infrastructure projects in energy and transport,
with Afghanistan’s participation30. Since the 1990s Russia has consistently sought
to torpedo some of these projects, which it sees as posing threats to its own in -
terests. Specifically, this concerns the oil pipeline which is projected to run from
the Pakistani port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, through Afgha nistan to China’s
Xinjiang province (which may reduce China’s interest in im porting oil from Rus-
sia), as well as the projected gas pipeline with a capacity of 33 billion m³ to run
from Dowletabad in Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to Fazilka
in India (knows as the TAPI pipeline, 1800 km in length, which should help fur-
ther diversify exports of Turkmenistan’s gas). However, the change of circum-
stances caused by the world economic crisis of 2008/2009, especially Russia’s
lack of interest in importing more gas from Turkmenistan, as well as the conclu -
sion of a long-term contract to supply Russian oil to China, contributed to a re vi -
sion of Russia’s stance towards the TAPI. In particular, in 2010 Russia began sig-


























30 For more, see e.g. ‘Mezhdunarodnyje otnosheniya v Tsentralnoy Azii w 2000-kh godakh’, in A. Bo -
ga turov, A. Dundich, Y. Troitski, Tsentralnaya Aziya 'Otlozhenny neytralitet' i mezhdunarodnyje
otnosheniya v Tsentralnoy Azii w 2000-kh godakh, Moscow, 2010; Mohamed Daud, ‘Afganskiy rynok
izmenit geoekonomicheskiy status Srednego Vostoka’, www.afghanistan.ru, 22 October 2010.
nalling its readiness to participate in the project31, and during President Karzai’s
visit to Moscow in January 2011, representatives of Russia led by President Med-
vedev lobbied publicly for Gazprom to participate in the project. In this case,
Moscow’s intention may be to divert natural gas exports from Turkmenistan to
the south-east, in order to reduce the likelihood of it being exported to Europe
(which would compete with Russian exports onto this lucrative market) or
China (where Russia wants to compete with Central Asian gas with its own de
facto planned supplies), as well as to gain the potential revenue from the con-
struction. Either way, Russia would have an impact on Turkmenistan’s impor-
tant infrastructure projects and export policy. Russia has hitherto habitually
supported projects for developing transport along the north-south line.
5. Russian aid to Afghanistan in the security sphere
Because the Afghan army and security forces still use post-Soviet equipment,
Russia assumed that it would play a significant role in reconstructing them. Re -
presentatives of the Russian government repeatedly made declarations to that
effect from 2002. However, Russia encountered growing obstacles from Afgha -
nistan on the matter, mainly due to US pressure. Russian dissatisfaction with
this, and the general cooling of relations between Russia and the West, can be
attributed to the fact that in 2005 Russia stopped delivering free equipment to
Afghanistan’s defence and law enforcement institutions. Russia was apparently
expecting to continue this cooperation on a commercial basis. Prospects in this
area began to become clearer after the settlement of Afghanistan’s debt in 2007,
and after an initial agreement to make such deliveries was concluded with the US


























31 Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin stated this in Ashgabat on 22 October 2010. See ‘Rossiya proy-
dot cherez Afganistan’: http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2010/10/22/3430957.shtml; see also ‘V ozhy-
danii ...’, op.cit. This even became one of the main causes of tension in relations between Russia and
Turkmenistan, which did not hide its scepticism about this prospect. It is true that early on in the
TAPI plan, the Russian company did formally join the international consortium (the memorandum
was signed in 1995; Gazprom subjects were supposed to get up to 10% of the shares), but this was
rather dictated by the desire to control work on the project, or the private benefits of the managers
associated with Gazprom. However, the project is dependent on the stabilisation of the situation in
Afghanistan. On the other hand, Russia is prepared to participate in a competitive pipeline running
from Iran-Pakistan (and possibly to India).
in 2008. In November that year, President Karzai appealed to Russian President
Medvedev for military-technical cooperation to resume. President Medvedev’s
response in January 2009 was positive but vague (the Russian president ex press -
ed his readiness to continue cooperation, but noted that it would be ne cessary
to agree on detailed conditions). Russia had probably hoped to make the sales
via the US, even though it was aware that Washington was increasingly count-
ing on rearming the Afghan army with Western hardware. However, due to the
‘reset’ in Russian-American relations, Russia decided to resume its li mited free
supply of arms to Afghanistan in 2010; this was probably a political invest-
ment, both in regard to Afghanistan and to the US.
5.1. Arms deliveries
During the fighting with the Taliban regime, Russia was the main provider of
weapons and military equipment to the Northern Alliance, and did not stop its
military and technical assistance after the creation of the new Afghan govern-
ment at the end of 2001. Russian assistance in this area took the forms of free
supplies of equipment and materials for military use; the limited commercial
supply of arms and military equipment (mainly funded by the US); and training
for officers and specialists from the defence & law enforcement institutions and
other Afghan services (mostly the anti-narcotics agency). Some of the latter was
free of charge, and some financed by foreign sources.
As for the free hardware and material aid for Afghanistan’s defence & law en -
forcement institutions from 2002 to 2005 (when it was halted), its value exceeded
US$300 million (according to the former head of the Russian trade mission in
Ka bul, Valery Ivanov; other Russian diplomats estimate the figure at US$200-
220 million)32. According to Russian information, this aid included equipment


























32 V. Ivanov, ‘Podpisanye soglasheniya ob uregulirovanii zadolzhennosti – shag k razvitiyu otno she niy’,
www.afghanistan.ru, 29 August 2007: http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/9800.html; Zamir Kabulov,
‘Rossiya gotova okazat' pomoshch v vostanovlenii afganskoy armii’, www.afganistan.ru, 4 March 2009.
It is difficult to compare the scale of this assistance to US involvement, which, according to official
data during the budget years of 2002-2010, allocated about US$34.7 billion to help the Afghan army
and security forces (including in the fight against drugs), of which around US$29 billion went on the
armed forces. Calculations based on C. Turnoff, Afghanistan: US Foreign Assistance, Congressional
Research Service, 12 August 2010: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40699.pdf
and a complex missile defence system for Kabul airport, communication equip-
ment, SUVs, trucks, repair shops, spare parts for military equipment, and tech-
nical manuals. In addition, eight Afghan MI helicopters were repaired for free
(2003), as were 4 AN military transport aircraft. In 2005, Afghanistan was sup-
posed to receive four MI-8 transport helicopters.
From available public sources, it is known that Afghanistan has received Rus -
sian heavy military equipment; in particular, on the basis of an agreement on
mi li tary cooperation from 1992, Afghanistan was to receive 50 T-55 and T-62
tanks, 80 BTR and BWP transporters, anti-aircraft batteries, howitzers, and Grad,
Fagot and Malutka rocket launchers33.
Talks on Russia resuming its free supply of weapons, especially helicopters and
small arms, to Afghan defence & law enforcement institutions were held be -
tween Russia and the US & NATO from 2007. Yet Russia has consistently taken
the position that the Afghan forces may receive no more than three Russian
heli copters for free, and that the remaining 18 units should be financed by the
United States and possibly other coalition partners34. In 2009, Afghanistan was
supposed to receive two MI transport helicopters from Russia. In March 2010,
information emerged about plans to create a trust fund within NATO for the
delivery of Russian helicopters. Over time, however, it turned out that no-one was
willing to make financial contributions to this fund, and its goal was limited
mainly to financing pilot training and technical maintenance35. A decision on
this matter was taken during the NATO-Russia summit in Lisbon on 20 No -
vember 201036. Meanwhile, discussions with the US on commercial deliveries
ended with the signing on 26 May 2011 of a contract between Rosoboron ex port
and the US Army command to purchase 21 new Russian MI-17 transport heli-


























33 Data is based on unpublished material from Andrzej Wilk of the CES, taken from Russian informa-
tion agencies.
34 Information based on author's interviews with Russian experts and a representative of NATO Head -
quarters in September-October 2010.
35 See the press conference given by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov after meeting the Foreign
Minister of Afghanistan Zalmay Rasul, op.cit.
36 A. Fiediashin, ‘Kakoy tsenoj Rossiya gotova spasti NATO w Afganistanie?’, RIA Novosti, 2 November
2010; RIA Novosti, 3 November 2010: http://www.rian.ru/world/20101103/292200227.html
copters for the air force in Afghanistan. The contract (with a value estimated
by commentators at over US$300 million), provides not only for the supply of
helicopters (the first batch in October 2011, the next in 2012), but also the
delivery of spare parts and maintenance37. Furthermore, in early June 2011,
Russia and the US announced the planned establishment of a maintenance cen-
tre for Russian helicopters on Afghan territory38.
Russia has also begun to supply Afghanistan with arms and ammunition. The
first, larger batch of weapons for the Afghan Interior Ministry (20,000 Kalash -
nikovs and 2.5 million pieces of ammunition) was delivered in early November
2010, on the basis of a bilateral agreement with Afghanistan. Russia has plan -
ned to make 16 more such deliveries. 
5.2. Training assistance
As for training programs for the Afghan defence and law enforcement institu-
tions, Russian information states that Russian military academies trained over
300 Afghan officers free of charge in the period from 2002 to 200540 (after this
period, it is most likely that this type of training was stopped). This training
was conducted at the Military Academy of Communications in St Peters burg
and at the military repair plants in Omsk and Ryazan, among other locations.
Moreover, as part of the international NATO-Russia Council (which was agreed
upon in December 2005, and became a permanent project in February 2008),
short training in how to combat illicit drug smuggling was given to 102 Afghan
anti-narcotics specialists between 2006 and August 2009 at the Interior Mini -


























37 Communiqué from the Federal Service for military-technical cooperation (FSVTS) of 30 May 2011,
www.fsvts.gov.ru. For the deal to be possible, the US sanctions on the Russian arms export monopo-
list, the Rosoboronexport company, were lifted in May 2010.
38 This was reported by the deputy director of the Federal Service for military-technical cooperation
(FSVTS) Vyacheslav Dzirkalns. Lenta.ru, 6 March 2011.
39 ‘Torgovlya idet’, Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 28 October 2010: www.mk.ru/economics/article/2010/10/
28/540136-togovlya-idet.html; RIA Novosti, 2 November 2010: http://www.rian.ru/defence_safety/
20101102/291783500.html
40 Borodavkin cited the figure of 160. Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksei Borodavkin for
ITAR-TASS, 21 August 2009, www.mid.ru.
stry’s All-Russian Institute for Advance Training at Domodedovo near Mos -
cow41. At the NATO-Russia summit in Lisbon in November 2010, consensus was
reached on expanding training for Afghan anti-narcotics officers; this included
plans to start training in a second Russian centre, at St Petersburg. In 2010, plans
were made to train a total of 225 officers from Afghanistan in Russia42.
In addition, as part of these international projects, Russian specialists from the
MChS ran training for Afghan de-mining engineers in Spain from April 2002,
and in late 2002 they were seconded to Switzerland for a similar purpose, to
the Swiss-financed De-Mining Centre, which was founded at Russia’s initiative.


























41 Interview with Borodavkin for ITAR-TASS, op.cit.
42 Lavrov’s press conference after meeting with Rasul, op.cit.
III. Russia and the US/NATO operations in Afghanistan
1. Russia’s attitude towards the Afghan operation
1.1. Russia on the initial phase of the operation
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Moscow was aware that the USA
and Britain would inevitably take military action against the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan, and did nothing to stop them. For some time, however, Moscow
was undecided on whether (or if so, how) to support the emerging interna-
tional anti-terrorist coalition. It seems that the decisive factor in determining
their decision was the public declarations of support for the coalition by most
countries in Central Asia, which came in mid-September, together information
about the Uzbek-US consultations on the use of military bases in Uzbekistan for
operations in Afghanistan. Moscow’s decision was made after a meeting be -
tween then-President Vladimir Putin and the heads of the institutions of force
in Sochi on 22 September 2001, and was publicly announced two days later.
Russia declared that it would open up air corridors for humanitarian aid ship-
ments to Afghanistan; that it would share intelligence information on terrorist
activities with the coalition members; that it would lend assistance in search
and rescue actions; increase Russian military aid to the Northern Alliance’s for ces;
and make its airports available, via the Central Asian states, to the coalition
forces. At the same time, however, leading Russian officials and the heads of the
de fence & law enforcement institutions held intensive consultations in the
Cent ral Asian countries which were essentially aimed at limiting the Western
military presence in the region and strengthening cooperation between these
countries in Russia’s security sphere43. 
The Russian contribution to the military victory over the Taliban in 2001 was
pri marily based on large arms deliveries to the Northern Alliance, which helped
it (along with American and British bombing) to carry out a successful offen-
sive and occupy a large part of Afghanistan, including Kabul. In the political





































43 For more, see Eurasia after 11 September, OSW Bulletin, No. 1, 2001.
field, however, there were clearly elements of rivalry with the West over the
shape of the new Afghan government and the orientation of the Afghan state
(see above).
1.2. Russia’s general attitude towards the international forces 
in Afghanistan
Russia supported the December 2001 UN Security Council resolution setting up
the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). In Moscow’s
eyes, this was a kind of military counterweight to the US-British coalition. From
the beginning, however, Russia stressed that any foreign forces in Afghanistan
must remain there only temporarily, solely to ensure security, and to complete
their mission as quickly as possible, as soon as the Afghan army and security
forces have been rebuilt, which should be the priority. The same applied to the
Western military presence in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan44. 
As early as the beginning of 2002, Russia already began signalling its concern
that the Western military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia might be
extended45. However, it decided not to create obstacles to the activities of the
anti-terrorism coalition. Moscow voted in favour of successive UN Security Coun-
cil resolutions prolonging the ISAF’s mandate. Moreover, despite public displays
of criticism, Russia also supported the 2003 extension of the ISAF’s mandate, its
number of forces and its geographical scope (beyond Kabul); nor did Moscow
oppose NATO’s takeover of the command in August 2003. It seems that this
compliance was dictated by two considerations. First, Russia was aware that
Afghan forces are not, and will long remain, unable independently to provide
security in the country (which was also one of the conditions for increasing
Russia’s economic presence). Secondly, Moscow thus demonstrated its support
for a central UN role in the regulation of crises (the ISAF was acting on the basis
of a mandate from the UNSC), and gave the West a positive example (against
the background of the negative cases of Yugoslavia and Iraq). In other words:
Only actions which include Russia as a co-decider can be effective.





































44 Cf. The Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement of 21 December 2001, www.mid.ru.
45 The first public signal of this was the speech by the head of the Russian Federation’s Federal Border
Service, General Konstantin Totski, in January 2002; cf. Eurasia after 11 September, OSW Bulletin, op.cit.
Russia had expressed its critical attitude towards the coalition (and indeed the
USA) in 2005, when the SCO’s 5 July summit in Astana led to a joint declaration
(initiated by Russia along with China) calling for a timetable for the withdraw-
al of international forces from Afghanistan and the Central Asian bases.
Especially since 2007, Russian assessments of the effects of the coalition’s actions
in Afghanistan have become increasingly critical and expressed in public. The
coalition is accused of being ineffective in ensuring security, and above all in
the fight against the illegal production and export of drugs. Russia has also
begun to denounce cases of accidental attacks by coalition forces on the civilian
population. All this was related on one hand to manifestations of Russia’s cool-
ing relations with the US, and on the other to its increasing political support for
Karzai’s government in Afghanistan (which was especially apparent after 2007).
Finally, in February 2009, Russian pressures and incentives led to the termina-
tion of Kyrgyzstan’s agreement with the United States on stationing their air
base at Manas international airport near Bishkek. However, the Kyrgyz-American
talks ended in June 2009 with a further agreement to station US forces at the
so-called Manas transit centre (with a revised mandate and for higher fees). The
Manas case was one of the reasons why Russia withdrew its political support
for the then President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev, and for its rapid sup-
port for the opposition that toppled him in April 2010. Moscow expected the
new Kyrgyz government’s attitude toward Manas to be guided by Russia’s posi-
tion, as they apparently wanted more direct influence on how the transit cen-
tre functioned46.





































46 For more, see W. Górecki, Russia’s position on the events in Kyrgyzstan (April – June 2010), OSW
Commentary No. 38, 27 July 2010; http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2010-07-
27/russias-position-events-kyrgyzstan-april-june-2010. Russia affects the functioning of the Manas
base by supplying aviation fuel (via a chain of opaque intermediaries linked to successive Kyrgyz gov-
ernments). In mid-2010, formal talks began on the Russian company Gazpromneft formally acquiring
some of the supply contracts to Manas. See ‘US-Russia discussing groundbreaking Manas fuel-supply
deal’, Eurasianet.org, 21 June 2010: www.eurasianet.org/node/61361; ‘Gazprom gotov vzat na sebya
rol postavshchika topliva dla tsentra Manas’, oilcaptal.ru, 27 October 2010: www.oilcapital.ru/news/
2010/10/271248_160217.shtml. It seems that the suggestions which Kyrgyz Prime Minister Almazbek
Atambayev has been making since spring 2011 about a possible Russian takeover of the management
of the Manas centre were a response to Russian pressure.
On the other hand, Russia gradually began increasing its support for the ISAF
mission by facilitating transport and transit (see below). This was Russia’s spe-
cific way of politically investing in its relations with individual Western coun-
tries and NATO, and which also had a sound financial motivation: commercial
support for the transport paid very well for Russia.
1.3. The drug problem
The problem of the illegal production and export of drugs (mainly heroin) from
Afghanistan to Russia, and the ISAF’s attitude towards this problem, has grad-
ually become an increasingly important element of Russian policy on the coali-
tion’s mission.
Russia has specifically emphasised that despite the growing Western military
presence in Afghanistan, and the process of reconstructing the Afghan armed
forces and security forces, not only has illegal drug production in Afghanistan
not decreased, but has in fact risen significantly. According to data cited by the
head of the FDCS, Viktor Ivanov, opium production in Afghanistan has risen
forty-fold over the past nine years (from 185 tonnes in 2001 to about 7600 ton -
nes). This assessment, however, is based on manipulated data47. 
Russia has pointed out that a significant portion of drugs from Afghanistan
have reached Russia via illegal routes through Central Asia (and revenue from
their sales in Russia runs at around US$13 billion); this has contributed to an
increase in drug consumption, which has become a serious social problem in
the Russian Federation. According to Ivanov, illegal narcotics kill 30,000 Rus sians
each year48. 





































47 At first, the year 2001 was exceptional, because the Taliban government launched their campaign
against opium production after the year 2000 (as a result of which it fell sharply from about 3000 tons
per year). Secondly, according to reliable estimates by the UNDP, opium production in Afgha nistan
since 2009 has fallen (by about 10% in 2009 to 6900 tonnes, and in 2010 by 48%, down to 3600 tons).
Data from Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010, UNDP, September 2010.
48 Data from a speech by V. Ivanov at the NATO-Russia meeting on 24 March 2010; www.sfo.fskn.
gov.ru/news/61/
For this reason, Russia has increasingly often and sharply criticised the ISAF for
its insufficient activity, and even its inaction, against the illegal production and
export of narcotics in Afghanistan. There have been suggestions that the West -
ern forces in Afghanistan are deliberately ignoring this threat, as they do not
want to provoke anti-Western sentiment in Afghan society (part of which relies
on poppy cultivation for their subsistence). Some Russian experts have even
made allegations that coalition forces have been directly supporting illegal drug
production and trafficking in Afghanistan49. 
Russia has ever more insistently demanded that fighting drug production and
trafficking become a priority for the ISAF in Afghanistan. At the NATO-Russia
Council Forum in March 2010, the head of the FDCS Viktor Ivanov even put for-
ward a very ambitious and comprehensive plan of cooperation covering the
political, legal, economic and security spheres (the Rainbow-2 plan)50. In June
2011, during a visit to Brussels, he called for the creation of an EU/Russia joint
agency which would take up the fight against drugs in Eurasia, in cooperation
with the UN and the CSTO51.
It seems that the rise in the importance of the drug problem resulted on one
hand from the real growth of this problem for Russia, but on the other hand, it
was to a great extent treated instrumentally. Firstly, this was a way to force
through cooperation in the security sphere with the Central Asian states and
China, including within the CSTO and STO, which are structures Russia dominates,
as also served the purpose to push the West, including NATO, to establish for-





































49 Conversations with Russian experts in September 2010.
50 He called for the following: recognition by the UN Security Council of the Afghan drug problem as
a threat to international peace and security; the implementation of a comprehensive plan for the
reconstruction and economic development of Afghanistan; increasing the efficiency of destroying
poppy crops in Afghanistan; imposing UN sanctions on tribal warlords who support poppy cultiva-
tion; revising the ISAF’s mandate by introducing compulsory destruction of poppy crops; raising con-
fidence in the exchange of sensitive anti-narcotic information; coordinating the training of Afghan
drug services; and the creation of an international agency for the liquidation of drug production in
Afghanistan. Ivanov’s speech at a meeting of the NATO-Russia council..., op.cit. See also Ivanov’s
speech at a meeting of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Afghanistan of the National Drugs
Committee, 14 February 2011, www.fskn.gov.ru.
51 See Ivanov’s speech at the conference in the European Parliament; http://fskn.gov.ru/includes/
periodics/speeches_fskn/2011/0627/050313592/detail.shtml
mal cooperation with the CSTO. Secondly, this was clearly an element of the
FDCS head Viktor Ivanov’s self-promotion, as he exploited this problem to
strength en his own position in the Russian ruling elite as well as his influence
on Russian foreign policy.
As for multilateral cooperation on the drug question in Central Asia, in 2000
Russia initiated the adoption of UN resolutions and other documents calling for
the creation of so-called ‘anti-narcotic security belts’ around Afghanistan. Since
then, this has become a constant demand of Russian diplomacy, which over time
has been expanded to include financial security (i.e. preventing anyone from
profiting from illegal drug trafficking). According to the Russian concept, one of
these ‘security belts’ was to have been created on Afghanistan’s border with
the countries of Central Asia, and another in Central Asia (preferably on the bor -
der between Russia and Kazakhstan). In connection with this, Russia lobbied
for financial support for a unit of Russian border guards to be stationed (up to
October 2005) on the Tajik-Afghan border. This support was to come from inter-
national sources, and to a limited extent, such support was provided. Russia’s
hope was that the West would find it necessary to maintain or even increase
the Russian military presence in the border areas of Central Asia. Moreover, the
fight against drug trafficking has become an area of cooperation within the
CSTO and SCO, and since 2003 an annual preventive CSTO operation codenamed
‘Channel’ (which started as a Russian initiative) has been held, to which Russia
has invited representatives of Afghanistan and NATO countries (Kabul and indi-
vidual NATO countries have delegated representatives on an ad hoc basis). In De -
cember 2010, an agreement was signed on multilateral cooperation in combat-
ing the drug trade by the ‘quartet’ of Russia, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In May 2011, at the initiative of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev (who an -
nounced it at an SCO summit in Tashkent the previous June), a draft SCO Drug
Strategy and plan of action was prepared. Russia also lobbied for a UN Security
Council resolution that would deem the production of and trade in Afghan drugs
as a threat to international peace and security. This could have created a formal
basis for a hypothetical military intervention in the region. In connection with
discussions to extend the Russian-Tajik agreement on cooperation in protecting
the border with Afghanistan (from 2004), Moscow also began to publicly de -
mand that a contingent (according to some information, numbering up to 3000
soldiers) of the Russian Federal Border Service return to the Tajikistan/Afgha -





































nistan border, a move which was primarily motivated by the increase of drug
smuggling across that border52.
The FDCS and its head Viktor Ivanov were among the main actors in Russian
policy toward Afghanistan in the period from 2009 to 2010. Thanks to their nu -
merous international contacts and agreements, the role of the FDCS in Russia’s
relations with the United States clearly rose in importance; for example, Ivanov
became joint leader of one of the working groups of the Russian-American pres-
idential committee for cooperation. The FDCS also worked closely with selected
European and Central Asia countries, China, the Islamic Republic of Afghani -
stan itself, and some of its other neighbours. Proof that this role was becoming
more important was the first joint anti-narcotics operation carried out in Afgha -
nistan, on 27-28 October 2010 in Nangarhar province; 4 FDCS officers were join -
ed by 70 officers of the American anti-narcotics agency and the Afghan Interior
Mi nistry53. Further joint operations like this were conducted in December 2010
and February 201154.
The Afghan drug problem was and remains one of the points of contention be -
tween Russia (which advocates a principled and unconditional fight against
poppy cultivation for the production of drugs, including by destroying the poppy
harvest with chemicals sprayed from the air) and the Western coalition partners,
who emphasise the need for a comprehensive approach to this problem, includ-
ing offering the people of Afghanistan economically attractive alternatives to
guarantee their livelihood and their basic security55. However, it seems that





































52 See Ivanov’s statement on 5 May 2011, www.afghanistan.ru, 6 May 2011; Reuters, 4 May 2011.
53 During the operation, four laboratories were detected and about a tonne of heroin was seized. The
operation initially sparked criticism from Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who said that the Afghan
authorities had not been forewarned about it (but Karzai quickly withdrew his criticism and praised
the action). Cf. ‘Makovy suverenitet podkoshen Afganistan’, Kommersant, 1 November 2010, http://
www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?fromsearch=2fa83ac2-6561-412b-befc-1fbf6e35d8bc&docsid=
1532357. According to information obtained from a Russian expert, the Russian Foreign Ministry were
not aware of the operation before it happened.
54 Information from Viktor Ivanov, Interfax, 4 July 2011.
55 Cf. www.lenta.ru/news/2010/03/25/reject/; www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2010/03/25/n_1474561.shtml;
D. Tutakayev, ‘Oruzhye makovogo porazheniya’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 March 2010; www.nwo.
ng.ru/printed/237903
both parties’ positions on this issue are coming together, as they are focusing
on the fight against drug-producing laboratories and warehouses, and on cut-
ting the supply routes for the so-called ‘precursors’ (the chemicals used for pro-
duction), exports of the drugs themselves, and on combating the laundering of
money derived from the drug trade56. 
2. The issue of military transit through Russia to Afghanistan
Moscow has been selective about facilitating military transit through Russian
territory to Afghanistan, in line with its own political interests. Individually,
agreements have been signed with Russia’s leading European partners on mil-
itary transit to Afghanistan: 
– on 9 October 2003, an agreement was concluded with Germany on the air-
borne transit of cargo and military troops to Afghanistan (and was put in prac-
tice in 2004);
– on 7 October 2004, a similar agreement was concluded with France (although
Russia only ratified it in December 2010);
– on 2 October 2008, an agreement was signed with Germany on military tran-
sit by rail (which began operation in November that year);
– on 3 March 2009, an agreement on military transit by air was signed with
Spain (which Russia ratified in December 2010);
– a similar agreement was signed with Italy on 16 February 2011.
Talks between Russia and NATO on transit, which had been ongoing since at
least mid-2006, ended with limited success: on 4 April 2008 at the NATO sum-





































56 Cf. Richard Weitz, ‘Russia returns to Afghanistan’, www.foreignpolicy.com, 3 November 2010;
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/03/russia_returns_to_afghanistan; in this context,
Russia’s demands include the introduction of a tracking system for ‘precursors’ derived from Europe.
mit in Bucharest, Russia and NATO reached an agreement on non-military rail
transit for the ISAF, and started to implement it in March 2009. The conclusion
of the agreement was undoubtedly related to Russia’s willingness to block fur-
ther NATO enlargement to the east, and was intended to demonstrate that
cooperation with Russia was a better alternative (including on Afghanistan, the
key issue for NATO). However, Russia made any possible agreement to military
transit for NATO conditional on the establishment of a formal relationship be -
tween NATO and the CSTO, a position upon which the Alliance has so far fail ed
to reach consensus. However, in 2010 there were signs that the Russian posi-
tion was easing. At the Russia-NATO summit on 20 November 2010, an agreement
was concluded on so-called return transit (from Afghanistan through Russian
territory) for NATO forces. At the same time, Moscow has agreed to include ar -
moured personnel carriers in the transit agreement.
The Russian-American summit in Moscow on 6 July 2009 formally concluded an
agreement (which Russia had initially agreed to in January 2009) on military air
transit. The US announced that it planned about 4500 flights per year, which
would save it around US$133 million. Due to procedural problems on the Rus -
sian side, however, the agreement only came into full force as of January 2010
(even before Russia’s formal ratification in March 2011). However, the number
of flights was initially much lower than expected.
The agreement with the United States was a gesture from Russia towards the
new Obama administration, which had pledged to make a positive break-
through in its relations with Russia. Moscow apparently decided to use this as
an argument that Washington must take account of key Russian interests.
3. Transport, non-military transit and other forms of support
Russian private companies have an almost monopolistic position on the strate-
gic airlift of cargo for the coalition members. The largest share belongs to the
Russian Volga-Dniepr company, with its vast AN-124 Ruslan transport aircraft;
it has concluded a charter agreement with the coalition allies and NATO. 
The Russian-Ukrainian consortium Ruslan-SALIS (created by the Russian com-
pany Volga-Dniepr and Ukraine’s Antonov company) hauled air transport for





































the 16 NATO members (and 2 partner countries, Sweden and Finland) within
NATO’s Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) programme from March 2006
until the end of 2010; its contract has now been extended until the end of 2012.
Their contract provides for the availability of six AN-124 aircraft for transport-
ing ’outsize’ cargo. Under the program, about 1700 flights and 90,000 tonnes
of cargo had been transported by the end of 2010. Russia has also proposed the
use of IL-761 transport aircraft57. 
Another consortium of the same companies, Ruslan International, made sepa-
rate agreements for transport from the USA and Great Britain. Another Russian
company which meets transport orders for the coalition forces is Polot, which
uses AN-124 Ruslan aircraft. The Russian company Aviacon-Cargo performs
transport services for the ISAF with IL-76 transport aircraft; the Russian com-
pany Vertikal-T charters helicopters. Based on publicly available information, it
is impossible to estimate the total profit which Russian companies are making
from the commercial implementation of transport services for the ISAF and
other coalition forces; we can only assume that it amounts to hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars58.
In addition, Rosoboroneksport provides Western contractors with specific spare
parts for helicopters, aircraft and communication equipment of Russian ori-
gin59. The sale of four MI-17 attack helicopters, which the Polish contingent in
ISAF used, was also important for Russia60. Moscow is also holding talks on the
paid certification of aerospace manufacturers in NATO member states in Cent -
ral and Eastern Europe to support MI-class helicopters under Russian li cen se,
in connection with the tender for the NATO agency NAMSA to buy MI-class heli -
copters61.





































57 Interview with the FSWTS’ deputy director V. Dzirkalns for the BBC’s Russian section, 18 January
2011; interview with Dzirkalns for Interfax-AWN, 4 March 2011.
58 Data is based on unpublished material by the CES’s Natalia Orlowska-Chyz, from Russian agency
re ports and information from NATO; see. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50106.htm. In addi-
tion, in 2001, the CIA bought two Mi-17 helicopters in Russia for its operations in Afghanistan.
V. Avierkov, ‘Rossiyskaya i sovetskaya aviatsyonnaya tiekhnika na sluzhbie NATO v Afganistanie’,
www.afghanistan.ru, 11 November 2009; http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/15983.html
59 ‘Torgovlya idet’, op.cit.
60 Fiediashin, ‘Kakoy cenoy...’, op.cit.
61 Interview with Dzirkalns for Interfax-AWN, 4 March 2011.
Russia is gradually increasing its role in the transport of non-military cargoes
for the NATO and US forces in Afghanistan. This is a key element of the so-called
Northern Distribution Network (NDN), whose participation in transit to Afghani -
stan is steadily rising, mainly at Pakistan’s expense. In mid-2010 30% of cargo
went via the NDN (65% of which runs through Russian territory); in May 2011,
the NDN’s share was already up to 60%, and the US has declared that it will rise
to 75%62.





































62 US–Russia Relations: ‘Reset’ Fact Sheet, The White House, 24 June 2010, at www.whitehouse.gov;
Statement by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics of the US Army, Mitchell Stevenson, ITAR-TASS, 23
May 2011.
IV. Russia’s regional activity concerning the Afghan question
1. The problem of Afghanistan in the CSTO and SCO
Even before 11 September 2001, Russia had been using the existing terrorist and
narcotics threats from Afghanistan in its attempts to strengthen security co -
ope ration with the Central Asian states and China, and to consolidate its influ-
ence in the region.
The threat of fundamentalism and terrorism linked to Afghanistan (including the
so-called Batken crises in 1999 and 2000), the Central Asian countries’ growing
concern at the export of Islamic extremism from Taliban-ruled Afghanistan,
and later the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and re-occurrences
of terrorism in the region, have created a strong impetus for closer cooperation
between the Central Asian states and China with Russia in the security sphere.
Elements of this process include the following:
– the signing of agreements on military cooperation between Russia and select-
ed countries in the region in autumn 1999; 
– the formation at the end of 2000 of the CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre; 
– the progressive institutionalisation of the Collective Security Treaty (which in
2003 was recast as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation) and the SCO,
including the establishment of a CSTO Rapid Reaction Force in the Central Asian
sector (2001), the CSTO Joint Staff (from 2004), the SCO’s Regional Anti-terror-
ist Centre (from 2001) and the CSTO Joint Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR, as decid-
ed in February 2009); 
– the growing Russian military presence in Central Asia (a new Russian base was
set up in Chkalovsk, Tajikistan at the end of 2000; at Kant airport in Kyrgyzstan
in September 2003); and
– Uzbekistan’s accession to the SCO (2000) and the CSTO (again since 2006). 












































Talks about establishing a Russian base in southern Kyrgyzstan (in the Osh or
Batken regions) and Russia’s possible use of more military airfields in Tajikistan
(especially the Ayni airport near Dushanbe) are also underway.
Moscow has exploited the growing illegal drug production and smuggling from
Afghanistan to and via Central Asia and Russia for the same reasons, including
by pushing the concept of anti-narcotic ‘security belts’, and by initiating the
‘Chan nel’ operation in 2003 (see above).
At Russia’s initiative, both the SCO and the CSTO have set up structures for re -
gular consultations on the Afghanistan question: within the SCO, a working group
on Afghanistan was founded in 2005, and a similar working group within the
CSTO was founded in 2006.
Russia has tried to bring Afghanistan into these multilateral cooperation ini-
tiatives. On 17 June 2004, President Karzai participated at Russia’s initiative in
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tashkent for the first time.
This move seems to have been intended to outline alternative international
forums for the Afghan authorities, as opposed to working closely with Pakistan
and Western countries. There was probably also another reason: an attempt to
channel the ever-stronger influence (especially economic) of China in Afgha ni -
stan, which Russia regards with unease.
There were also other initiatives which served Afghanistan’s involvement: The
launching (again at Russia’s initiative) in 2006 of a Russian-NATO training pro-
gramme for anti-narcotics professionals from Central Asia and Afghanistan
(Russia’s original intent was for this to be a part of cooperation between NATO
and the CSTO, but the Alliance did not agree to this); the involvement of Afghan
officers in the CSTO’s ‘Channel’ operation in 2007, and the joint declaration and
Plan of Action from the SCO states and Afghanistan in the fight against terror-
ism, drug trafficking and organised crime, which was adopted at a conference
in Moscow in March 2009 (including joint training, exercises and the creation
of a regional anti-narcotics centre).
In 2011, Russia supported the idea of granting observer status for Afghanistan
at the SCO, and declared its support for a greater role for the SCO in Afghani -












































stan. This was probably connected with plans to reduce the Western military
presence in Afghanistan and the US’s attempts at constructively engaging the
organisation (and especially China) in resolving the Afghan problem.
2. The problem of Afghanistan’s new regional format 
(Pakistan, Tajikistan)
In June 2009, Russia created a new format for dialogue in the region: the Russia-
Afghanistan-Pakistan ‘troika’ (the presidents of Russia (Dmitri Medvedev), Afgha -
nistan (Hamid Karzai) and Pakistan (Asif Ali Zardari) first met together on 15 June
2009 at the first trilateral meeting of the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg). Next,
a meeting of foreign ministers was held in this format on 26 June 2009 in Trieste,
where they decided to investigate the possibility of cooperating in border pro-
tection, counter-terrorism information exchange, counter-terrorism and anti-
narcotics training, and the promotion of regional trade63. 
This move seemed on one hand to have been dictated by the recognition (which
the West had already made) of the close connection between the situation in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and also probably to Russia’s new readiness to reach
out to the Pashtun communities associated with Pakistan, including the ‘mode -
rate Taliban’. In this way, Russia is apparently preparing for possible future po -
litical changes in Afghanistan.
On 18 August 2010 in Sochi, the presidents of Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and
Tajikistan met together, with the intention of launching a new Russian-created
four-party dialogue (it was also announced that there would be regular meet-
ings between these countries’ economic and foreign ministers). The main topic
was the security risks associated with the situation in Afghanistan and the fight
against illicit drug trafficking. However, they also discussed economic pro jects
in the region, including Afghanistan (especially the modernisation of the Salang












































63 Joint statement by the foreign ministers of Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Trieste, 26 June 2009,
www.mid.ru.
tunnel and the construction of hydroelectric plants)64. The meeting showed
that Russia has perceived the marked increase in the neighbouring countries’
importance and influence on the situation in Afghanistan, and wants to seek
support for promoting its own economic interests, including developing power
gene ration in Afghanistan and its vicinity. The second summit in this format
took place in Dushanbe on 2 September 2011. 
On 22 September 2010, on the occasion of the UN General Assembly in New
York, the first meeting of the foreign ministers of this new ‘quartet’ was held,
during which they discussed the situation in the region, the fight against terro -
rism and drug trafficking, and how to develop economic cooperation.













































V. Russia on the future of the Afghan problem
1. Russia’s official position on Afghanistan
If we were to briefly summarise Russia’s current official position on the Afghan
problem, it would sound like this: 
It is in Russia’s interest that Afghanistan be independent, integral and neutral,
living in peace with its neighbours, and not a source of threats to the interna-
tional environment. Russia is concerned about the deteriorating security situa-
tion in Afghanistan. This is why it supports the efforts of the Afghan govern-
ment and international forces, whose continued presence in Afghanistan is
necessary in the current situation. However, their results have been insuffi-
cient. It is thus necessary to implement a comprehensive strategy to activate
the reconstruction assistance and strengthen Afghanistan’s power structures;
to give the Afghan government more influence in shaping security policy; to
fight hard against drug production and trafficking; and to make efforts to accel-
erate the country’s economic reconstruction. These activities should be under-
taken with the broad participation of interested international actors, without
discrimination against anyone. The role of Afghanistan’s neighbours and inter-
national organisations, in particular the SCO and CSTO, in resolving the Afghan
problem should be enhanced. Rank and file members of the Taliban should be
encouraged to join the reconciliation process, on condition that they acknowl-
edge the legal status quo; but there can be no question of talks with the most
extreme of the Taliban’s leaders. The central role in resolving the problem
should be played by the UN and the people of Afghanistan.
2. Russia on the prospect of Western forces 
withdrawing from Afghanistan
Since 2009, it has been ever more apparent that the key participants in the
Afghan operation wish to begin the process of withdrawing their forces from
Afghanistan. At that time, the framework of a new American strategy was pre-
sented, which depended on an initial increase of their own contingent and of
other contingents in Afghanistan; undertaking offensive operations against






























armed groups in Afghanistan; and then beginning the process of withdrawing
Western forces, linked to the increasing responsibility of the Afghan army and
security forces for their state’s security. In accordance with US President Barack
Obama’s declaration in December 2009, and the initial plan announced in June
2011, the withdrawal process began in July 2011. This is to proceed until about
the year 2014, when full responsibility for security is to be transferred to the
Kabul government, although this does not assume the total removal of the US
and Western military presence in Afghanistan. At the same time, intensive US-
Afghan negotiations on a strategic partnership agreement have been ongoing;
according to media leaks, these are aimed at maintaining some form of US mili -
tary presence in Afghanistan65.
This has opened up the prospect of different scenarios of how the situation
would develop. These include the possibility that the Taliban will actually re -
turn to power in Afghanistan, if not as a result of military success, then as part
of the so-called process of national reconciliation (also, since the Kabul conference
in July 2010, called the ‘Kabul process’), which is being carried out with increas-
ing intensity by the Karzai government, and is officially supported by the lead-
ing states in the coalition. Another implied possibility is the effective disinte-
gration of the country into a Taliban-dominated south and a northern Afgha ni -
stan fighting against them.
On the other hand, the prospect of strengthening the US military presence in
Afgha nistan, and/or the partial relocation of US forces to certain Central Asian
states neighbouring Afghanistan, is also taking shape. According to some Rus sian
experts, the US could be expected to leave thirty to fifty thousand American
soldiers at bases in Afghanistan, and create new US bases and transit centres,
particularly in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (the latter would play an important
role in the land transit of US troops withdrawn from Afghanistan)66. 






























65 Statements by politicians and US officials on this issue were unclear. The most reliable note was
sounded by the outgoing US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, who suggested that under a future
agreement, formally Afghan military bases could be used by US troops. See Gates' statement for the
Tolo agency: Afghanistan.ru, 7 June 2011.
66 See V. Dubovitski, ‘Amerikanskaya sud'ba Afganistana ot A do Ya’, Afghanistan.ru, 25 March 2011:
http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/19795.html; A. Serenko, ‘Posle Afganistana: Uroki vyvoda vojsk’,
Afghanistan.ru, 15 February 2011: http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/19520.html; O. Nessar, ‘Afga nistan
The official representatives of the Russian Federation have reacted to this situ-
ation in two ways. Firstly, they have expressed concern about the prospect of
Western forces withdrawing from Afghanistan, particularly in too hasty a man-
ner. Russia’s ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin warned against this in a dra-
matic tone (as did Boris Gromov, the commander of the former 40th Soviet Army
in Afghanistan, and now Governor of the Moscow region, in an article pub-
lished on 11 January 2010 in the New York Times)67. The serious danger if West -
ern forces withdraw was also mentioned in February 2011 by Deputy Prime
Minister Sergei Ivanov, in a speech at a conference on security policy in Mu nich68.
Also, the president’s special representative for Afghanistan Zamir Kabu lov said
in May 2011 that “before talking about leaving Afghanistan, there is a need to
resolve the Afghan problem.69” President Medvedev himself expressed this idea
in a more understated way at a meeting with President Karzai in Moscow in
January 201170. The Afghan forces’ ill-preparedness to take respon sibility for
security over the next three years has also been mentioned by Russia’s ambas-
sador in Kabul, Andrei Avetisian71. 






























v lovushke neopredelonnosti, Rossiya v globalnoy politike’, No. 2, Global Affairs March-April 2011:
http://www. globalaffairs.ru/number/Afganistan-v-lovushke-neopredelennosti-15185
67 The authors wrote: “It is imperative for all three [NATO, Western security and the future of Central
Asia] for NATO to honour its commitments to Afghanistan”, “Officials in Brussels and Washington
who are considering a quick exit strategy from Afghanistan for the ISAF mission are involved in devising
a suicidal plan. Withdrawal without victory may lead to the political collapse of the Western security
structures”, “The withdrawal will give a powerful impetus to Islamic militants, destabilise the
Central Asian republics and launch waves of refugees, including many thousands who will head for
Europe and Russia”, ”We are deeply dissatisfied with the sentiment of surrender at NATO headquar-
ters, whether under the guise of 'humanitarian pacifism' or pragmatism”, “We urge NATO forces to
remain in the country, until conditions are right for the establishment of stable local government,
which can resist the forces of radical forces, and can control the country.” At the same time, they stated
that Russia and the Central Asian countries were preparing a CSTO Rapid Reaction Force “in the event
of NATO’s failure in Afghanistan.” B. Gromov, D. Rogozin, ‘Russian advice on Afghanistan’, The New
York Times, 11 January 2010; www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/opinion/12iht-edrogozin.html
68 Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov stated that “the departure from here [Afghanistan] of peacekeeping
forces, including NATO troops, may pose a military threat to us [Russia]”,' Interfax-AWN, 7 February 2011.
69 ‘Nuzhno idti w Afganistan…’, op.cit.
70 At a joint press conference, President Medvedev stated: “And as for the future, I would like all the
in ternational presence in Afghanistan, all the foreign military contingents, to complete their part of
commitments to support peace and security in Afghanistan, and to leave Afghanistan in glory and
res pect.” ‘Press-konferentsya po itogam rossijsko-afganskikh peregovorov’, Moscow 21 January 2011,
www.kremlin.ru
71 Reuters, 22 June 2011. 
On the other hand, media leaks about the possible establishment of permanent
US military bases in Afghanistan have provoked critical reactions in Moscow.
Zamir Kabulov ironically pointed out that conditions on site may prevent such
plans, and warned that “leaving US military bases behind on the basis of long-
term contracts may significantly worsen the regional situation, and develop
into a source of tension72.” This was a clear warning shot at Washington, like
the earlier criticism from the Russian Foreign Ministry in February 201173. 
Moreover, Russia has clearly demanded guarantees from the US that there will
be no expansion of the American and NATO military presence in Central Asia.
This topic was one of the most important points discussed during the Russian
defence minister Anatoly Serdiukov’s visit to the US in September 201074.
When analysing Russia’s attitude in this new situation, we can discern the clear
directions of its activity. In particular, Moscow has taken the following steps:
it has sought to influence the development of the internal situation in
Afghanistan, including by strengthening collaboration with the Karzai govern-
ment and establishing contacts with the Taliban;































73 Doubt was expressed as to whether this would be consistent with the declarations that Western
forces would withdraw by 2014; with the process of national reconciliation in Afghanistan; with the
provisions of the Russian-American presidents’ declaration in June 2010 in support of for the neu-
trality of Afghanistan, and concern was expressed about the reaction from the states neighbouring
Afghanistan. ‘Kommentariy Departamenta informacyi i pechati MID Rossii otnositelno soobsh che niy
SMI o namerenii SShA razmestit' vojennye bazy na territorii Afghanistana’, 18 February 2011:
http://www.mid.ru/brp 4.nsf/0/87CA594848E07BD8C325783B00500B2D. On the other hand, the Russian
ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin suggested that the US had found a pretext for leaving a contin-
gent of its troops in Afghanistan. Cf. Rosbalt, 6 July 2011; http://www.rosbalt.ru/moscow/2011/07/06/
866733.html
74 Minister Sierdiukov was then supposed to obtain assurances that the withdrawal of Western forces
in Afghanistan would not involve an increase in the Western military presence in Central Asia. This
meant not creating new bases in Kyrgyzstan and the withdrawal of the US forces which were already
there. Cf. Praym-TASS, 17 September 2010; http://www.prime-tass.ru/news/0/% 7B3C73F304-51B4-
4ECE-AEB3-8F49F363C880% 7D.uif. In December 2008, The Chief of General Staff of the Russian Fe de -
ration’s Armed Forces, General Nikolai Makarov, expressed concern about US plans to establish bases
in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Cf. Regnum, 16 December 2008, http://www.regnum.ru/news/
1099984.html
it has activated cooperation with the US and NATO, expanding its offer of sup -
port for Afghanistan and the coalition forces (including the question of return
transit);
it has sought to prevent any shifting the burden of Western, especially Ame -
rican military presence from Afghanistan into Central Asia and becoming a per-
manent fixture there; 
it has activated contacts with Afghanistan’s neighbours (particularly Paki stan
and Tajikistan), leading a dialogue on the situation in that country;
it has intensified attempts to create instruments for the increase of  its secu-
rity presence in Central Asia
3. Scenarios for Russia’s future policy
Despite the growing involvement of Western military forces, the security situa -
tion in Afghanistan is deteriorating. The Taliban’s forces, who are drawing on
their resources and backup on the Pakistani-Afghan border, are striking more
and stronger blows at the government forces, still rather weak, and the inter-
national forces, still numerically insufficient. Meanwhile, the societies of dem-
ocratic Western countries cannot continue to tolerate such a high level of loss-
es, and have been exerting increasing pressure on their governments to with-
draw from Afghanistan as quickly as possible (although in the case of the US
government, this would not necessarily mean complete withdrawal). Both the
Afghan government and the majority of the coalition partners are inclined to
hold talks with the Taliban, which may in the near future lead to a power-shar-
ing scenario with them (and, in fact, to grant them power under certain con-
ditions). This, in turn, may (but need not) lead the way to resistance in the
northern part of the country, which is dominated by non-Pashtun nationalities.
If this move proves effective, it could lead to the country being divided into two
zones separated by the Hindu Kush mountain range.
For Russia, this basically means a simple choice between two strategies: taking
action aimed at maximally strengthening the anti-Taliban front, both inside






























and outside Afghanistan; or preparation for a gradual, peaceful transfer of po -
wer to the Taliban, and establishing pragmatic relations with them.
3.1. Russia and the ongoing fight against the Taliban
On one hand, Russia could make an effort to restore the Northern Alliance in
Afghanistan, and to some extent, to work for a return to the status quo ante of
the mid-1990s. With Russian political, financial and military support (although
the direct involvement of the Russian military is unlikely) a kind of buffer
would be created in northern Afghanistan against the Taliban-controlled south
of the country.
At the same time, Russia would reactivate its previous anti-Taliban international
alliance, involving India, Iran, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as the United
States and leading Western countries, which together with Russia could make
an attempt to build a kind of cordon sanitaire around Afghanistan, both as an
ob stacle to the export of Islamic radicalism to Central Asia and beyond, and to
the trafficking of illegal drugs.
One reason why such a scenario could work is the danger that the Taliban’s
total control of Afghanistan would pose to Russia. It is likely that the Taliban
would attempt to export radical Islam to Central Asia; if successful, this would
also strike at Russia’s interests in the region (the Russian political and military
presence could be seen as culturally and ideologically alien there). They could
also support Islamic radicalism in the Russian North Caucasus, as happened in
the 1990s. This would also certainly contribute to an increase in narcotics ex -
ports, which would cause Russia further harm. Moreover, cooperation in com-
bating the Taliban would enhance Russia’s military presence in at least some
regions in Central Asia, and lead to their bilateral and multilateral cooperation
with Russia. On the other hand, Russia would become an important partner for
the US and NATO in deterring and locating the Taliban, which could bring addi-
tional benefits to Moscow’s political and economic sphere. If a stable buffer zone
was created in the north of Afghanistan, resulting in its de facto partition, Russia
also could attempt to exploit this situation for its own economic interests (for
example, in the key deposits of raw materials located in northern Afghanistan,
which Moscow is interested in).






























Against this scenario is the fact that Russian influence with the former repre-
sentatives of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan has decreased in recent years,
its place now taken by other actors. It is not certain that Russia would be the
major patron of the anti-Taliban opposition; this task could successfully be
taken over by the US and NATO (which according to some Russian experts, is
already happening). This would lead to the dangerous perception, from Mos -
cow’s perspective, that it was being replaced as the main actor and sponsor of
mili tary co-operation with the Central Asian states in the security sphere, as ‘back-
up for the front’. That in turn could lead to the implementation of a ‘black sce-
nario’ for Russia: the transfer of the Western military presence’s main focal point
from Afghanistan to Central Asia, a presence which could grow and become
permanent. 
3.2. A modus vivendi between Russia and the Taliban
Russia could support Karzai’s policy of ‘national reconciliation’ more strongly,
and try for a more direct involvement in its implementation. In particular,
Russia could, by direct informal contacts with the Taliban, try to become the
actual patron of some of the conservative Pashtuns. It could also strengthen its
cooperation with Pakistan, including with its secret services, in an attempt to
win greater influence over the internal situation in Afghanistan. Thus, Russia
would support the continued unity of Afghanistan as the price of this ‘Taliba -
ni sation’75.
This scenario is made more likely by the fact that the Karzai government. with
the support of at least part of the country and some Western elites, has in fact
already engaged in dialogue with the Taliban as part of the policy of ‘national
reconciliation’. The US and other Western states are actually not attempting to
win the ‘war on the Taliban,’  but rather to create immediately the conditions
to withdraw the bulk of their forces from Afghanistan (by 2014). In this situa-
tion, Russia’s search for a modus vivendi with the Taliban would signify that it
accepted the logic of this already ongoing process, and a kind of ‘retreat for-
wards’. Furthermore, if they successfully completed (or at least significantly






























75 Russian expert and politician Semyon Bagdasarov, a member of the International Committee of the
State Duma, is one of those who favours such a scenario.
reduced) the armed Afghan conflict through political means, the reason for a sub -
stantial Western military presence – not only in Afghanistan, but also (which is
key for Russia) in Central Asia – would disappear. The ‘Talibanisation’ of Afgha -
nistan, combined with the withdrawal of Western forces from that country,
would certainly raise serious concern from the countries of Central Asia, which
would now be more exposed to Islamic radicalism and narcotics from Afgha -
nistan. This could be a strong argument for strengthening their military co -
operation in the security sphere with Russia, which would create a counter-
weight not only to Western influence, but also to China’s rapidly growing influ-
ence in the region.
Against this scenario speaks the risk of the export from Afghanistan to Central
Asia, and perhaps also to Russia itself, of destabilisation caused by Islamic
extremism, as described earlier. Above all, there is uncertainty as to the atti-
tude of the United States and Central Asian states to any potential ‘Tali ba ni sa -
tion’ of Afghanistan. Just as was (temporarily) the case in the 1990s, they may
see some advantages to a stabilised situation, and some of them might even
establish their own pragmatic relationships with the new Afghan authorities.
This could create a new geopolitical situation in the region, and open up the
pos si bility of implementing major infrastructure projects (in energy and trans-
port), connecting Central and South Asia, which would not necessarily be com-
patible with the interests of the Russian Federation. In turn, if the US and Cent -
ral Asian states’ attitude towards the Taliban in Afghanistan remained more
hostile, there would be a risk (from Russia’s standpoint) that the creation of
a cordon sanitaire around Afghanistan would be associated with increased, rather
than reduced US cooperation in the security sphere, as well as a greater US mili-
tary presence in Central Asia. This could in turn encourage China to strength-
en its security cooperation with the Central Asian countries to counterbalance
the presence of the West, a move which would be potentially dangerous in
Moscow’s eyes.































The above considerations indicate that Russia is facing a difficult choice regard-
ing its further strategy towards the Afghan problem. The optimal scenario for
Russia – the significant strengthening of the Afghan security forces and the
Karzai government, which would guarantee the possibility of the Western
forces’ imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan and Central Asia without lead-
ing to deepening instability – seems unlikely. It is not entirely clear which of the
other options is currently favoured by the Russian government. It seems that
Moscow has no coherent or consistent strategy. It is likely that the Russian rul-
ing elite, like expert circles76, is divided on this issue. Probably we are dealing
here, on one hand, with supporters of Pre si dent Karzai or the former Northern
Alliance, or supporters of a modus vivendi with the Taliban; on the other hand,
there are those who favour stronger support for the international forces and
cooperation with the West, or the supporters of ‘armed neutrality’ and dis-
placing the West from Afghanistan and Central Asia. In practice, the Russian
authorities now seem to be simultaneously implementing elements of all the
strategies outlined above, thus trying to leave themselves the widest possible
room for manoeuvre.
Marek Menkiszak
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76 See, e.g. D. Trenin, A. Malashenko, ‘Afganistan. Vzglad iz severa’, Moscow Carnegie Centre, Moscow
2010; Y. Krupnov et al., ‘Put' k miru i soglasiyu v Afganistane opredeliayetsa pozitsyjej, kotoruju
zaymiot Rossiya’, Moscow 2008; A. Umnov, ‘Rossiya yedinom zainteresovana v Afganistanie’,
Afghanistan.ru, 23 August 2007; V. Yevskieyev, ‘Afganistan kak obshchaya rossiysko-amerikanskaya
problema’, RIA Novosti 29 June 2009; Bagdasarov’s interview for RIA Novosti, 30 June 2008;
http://viperson.ru/wind.php?ID=473822&soch=1; Omar Nessar, ‘Afganistan v lowushkie ...’, op.cit.
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